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I. INTRODUCTION
The ability of members of a democratic society to participate in the
system of government is essential to the maintenance of a strong and
orderly community. To be a citizen is to be able to take part in the func-
tioning of government, and in the process by which decisions are made.
Yet, we are currently in the middle of an unheralded due process crisis,
which threatens to exclude a large number of people-the poorest mem-
bers of American society-from almost every aspect of participation in
the processes by which decisions about them are made, and thus reduces
their status to less than full citizenship. As a result of an ongoing due
process counterrevolution, a large segment of the population is becoming
increasingly disenfranchised and excluded from the body politic. The
formalized manner in which the Supreme Court addresses procedural
issues has failed to protect those who need protection most from arbitrary
governmental action that threatens the very basis of their livelihood. It is
time for the Court to re-think the nature of procedural rights, incorporat-
ing more effective notions of fairness and equality in order to put sub-
stance back into process.
Many scholars have criticized the Court's approach to due process
as confusing, inconsistent and ineffective.' It has been called a doctrine
which "subsists in confusion, ''2 "a pathological combination of ineffectu-
alness and destructiveness."3 Some scholars have recognized that the
Court is undergoing a retreat from the due process revolution of the
1960s, and have called the retreat a counterrevolution.' However, they
have not acknowledged the fact that the counterrevolution is most se-
verely affecting the poor. The failure of the Court's due process jurispru-
dence is most evident in the Court's treatment of the people who most
risk arbitrary action by the government because of their lack of economic
resources and political power. An in-depth analysis of the Court's ap-
proach to the due process rights of poor people will help to elucidate the
manner in which the Court's due process jurisprudence fails to meet the
needs of society as a whole.
Dating back to the Magna Carta, the concept of due process has
encompassed both procedural and substantive elements For example,
the due process prohibition against arbitrariness stems from both the sub-
1. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 41 (1985);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional
Remedies, 93 COLJM. L. REv. 309, 309 (1993); Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 189 (1991).
2. Fallon, supra note 1, at 309.
3. Farina, supra note 1, at 189.
4. See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 29-30. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due
Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996) (tracing the history of the
due process revolution, which expanded the scope of interests protected by procedural due process).
5. See Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1992).
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stantive notion that to be arbitrary is to be unprincipled, and the proce-
dural notion that a decision is arbitrary by definition if it is made without
allowing those affected to participate.' That is, due process has always
encompassed substantive values of equality and fairness. Yet, there is a
strong tension between the communitarian view of due process as a
means to achieve a just society, and the individualist view of due process
as a means to protect an individual's life, liberty, or property from out-
side interference.
The history of due process in our country reflects both views of due
process. The drafters of the Constitution emphasized the importance of
individual freedom to protect people from incursions by each other, and
by the state.7 To the extent that they were influenced by communitarian
ideals, they believed that the community would be strengthened if indi-
viduals were protected from each other.8 Hence, when drafting the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, "the Framers wanted to pre-
serve their property from the vast unpropertied populace.... Protecting
the rights of the elite from the incursion of the poor masses."9 Similarly,
the early capitalist economy relied on individual businessmen achieving
economic success on an individual basis, without any communitarian
notion of economic values. The Constitution does not purport to provide
any basis for economic justice and does not provide for positive rights or
protections. Rather, the Constitution is a negative document, based on
the notion that people have some inalienable rights that cannot be taken
away from them, and protecting those people from the usurpation of
those rights. In particular, the property of the affluent members of society
was protected from being arbitrarily taken away from them, by the gov-
ernment or anyone else, by the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the
Constitution.
However, the neutral language of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment still held out a communitarian promise of participation
to all citizens. Moreover, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment ar-
guably had more of a communitarian and egalitarian view of due process
when they included an identical clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect a weak minority (ex-slaves) from the power of the majority."°
Sparked by the massive unemployment and poverty of the Depression,
6. Id. at 6; see also Lawrence Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process
and Substantive Constitutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987) (arguing that substantive
values affect all procedural decisions).
7. Rutherford, supra note 5, at 10-11; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 163 (1989) ("The Constitution-the constituting document of this
state society-with its interpretations assumes that society, absent government intervention, is free
and equal; that its laws, in general reflect that; and that government need and should right only what
government has previously wronged.").
8. MACKINNON, supra note 7.
9. Rutherford, supra note 5, at 10-11.
10. Id.atll-12.
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communitarian ideals were the impetus for the New Deal legislation,
including the passage of the Social Security Act that established Social
Security and Aid to Families with Dependent Children." Similarly, the
notion of due process began to be transformed by the Court from an in-
dividualist doctrine to a more communitarian one based on protecting the
welfare of the larger community." Three decades later, Charles Reich,
the "father" of the due process revolution, argued that procedural protec-
tions should be extended to those who had not been protected by the in-
dividualist framework-that is, recipients of government benefits."
Reich argued that those benefits must be treated as property, with the
concomitant procedural protections." Extending the procedural protec-
tions enjoyed by the affluent owners of "old property" to the poorer
owners of "new property" would result in a more equitable system of
justice. As such, Reich's focus was not on individual protections, but on
achieving a system that was fair to the entire community.
In the case of Goldberg v. Kelly," the Court expressed a communi-
tarian view of due process, influenced by the theories of Charles Reich,
when it found procedural protections for the poor people who benefit
from government programs in the same constitution that was written for
the rich and powerful.'6 In his Goldberg opinion, Justice William Bren-
nan spoke of the dignitary value of process in eloquent language that
hinted at the promise of substantive justice and equality.'" However, in
the subsequent case of Mathews v. Eldridge,'8 the Court appeared to put
aside the egalitarian, communitarian rationale of Goldberg and relied on
more formalist, individualist reasoning.' The individualist approach of
the Court in Mathews limited the ability of the due process revolution to
better the lives of the poor.
The other significant limitation on the due process revolution was
the fact that the Court confined its communitarian approach to the proce-
dural realm and refused to extend it to the substantive realm. In the case
of Dandridge v. Williams,' the Court refused to recognize the substantive
right to welfare benefits in the Constitution. An examination of the
11. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1994).
12. Rutherford, supra note 5, at 13.
13. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 758-60 (1964) [hereinafter
Reich, The New Property]; see also Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1256 (1965) [hereinafter Reich, Individual Rights].
14. Reich, The New Property, supra note 13, at 785-86.
15. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
16. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270.
17. Id. at 264-65. In a later speech, Justice Brennan described his opinion in Goldberg as
"injecting passion into a system whose abstract rationality has led it astray." See William J. Brennan,
Jr., Reason, Passion and "The Progress of Law," The Forty-Second Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo
Lecture, 10 CARDOzo L. REv. 3, 20 (1988).
18. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
19. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-45.
20. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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Court's contrasting rulings in Goldberg and Dandridge reveals a con-
nection between substantive rights and procedural rights that underlies
all of the Court's due process jurisprudence.2' The more economic re-
sources a person possesses, the more likely that person will benefit from
an individualist approach to process which merely incorporates formalist
procedural protections. On the other hand, a person with fewer economic
resources would undoubtedly benefit from a more communitarian ap-
proach which also incorporates substantive protections. Ironically, how-
ever, the Court has historically refused to formally recognize substantive
protections for poor people, but has been considerably more willing to
provide substantive protections to people with more economic resources.
For example, in the Lochner era, the Court applied notions of substantive
due process to strike down state statutes that restricted business in order
to benefit working people.' Recently, the Court has returned to such a
substantive due process approach to defining rights of the more affluent
in cases involving compensation for regulatory takings.' As a result, the
Court has been inconsistent in its approach to process depending on the
financial resources of the parties involved.
The Court's formalist individualist approach to process in the years
since its Goldberg ruling, and its refusal to recognize substantive eco-
nomic rights, has opened the door for the ongoing counterrevolution,
which is significantly eroding the due process rights of poor people. '
Shortly after its ruling in Goldberg, the Court began restricting the
framework of rights that are protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' In addition, the Court has recently added to the
restrictions on the amount of process to which an individual is entitled
when she has established that the interest in question falls within the
framework of rights protected by the Due Process Clause.' Congress also
has participated in the due process counterrevolution. Significantly, Con-
gress recently passed a welfare reform bill that ends the entitlement
status of welfare benefits, placing Goldberg itself in jeopardy.' Congress
also recently enacted restrictions on the ability of poor people to obtain
meaningful representation by an attorney, to bring civil actions, and to
lobby effectively.28 In contrast, procedural protections for more affluent
members of our society remain in good standing. While the Court has
narrowed the definition of "new property," procedural protections for
21. See infra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
22. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
23. See infra notes 260-78 and accompanying text.
24. See Pierce, supra note 4.
25. See id. at 1977-78.
26. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); Pierce, supra note 4. at 1988-89.
27. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1990-91; infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text. See
generally Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don't Add Up To Rights: The Importance of Preserving
Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111 (1996)
(reviewing recent congressional welfare reform measures).
28. See infra notes 203-28 and accompanying text.
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owners of "old property," who tend to be more affluent, have not been
challenged. 9 Moreover, the Court has taken an activist stance in ex-
panding the rights of owners of "old property" in the doctrine of com-
pensation for regulatory takings."
The widening gap between the rich and the poor in this country has
been well documented.' Equally serious, but less widely acknowledged
is the burgeoning gap between the procedural rights of the rich and poor.
Increasingly, due process is returning to its individualist roots-protect-
ing those who have property from losing it, but failing to protect those
who do not have property as it is traditionally defined. A communitarian
view of due process, with its promises of fairness and equality, has often
been lost in the Court's formalism. However, in some cases involving the
substantive and procedural rights of poor people, the Court still has taken
more of a communitarian approach. 2 It is the central thesis of this article
that the Court should return to a communitarian view of process, in
which process is viewed as a means to establish a just society, to enable
all people to participate fully in our democracy without limitations im-
posed by a lack of economic resources or political power.
The problem that this article addresses is not one that affects only
the poor. When large numbers of citizens are disenfranchised, lacking an
investment in the functioning of our political system, they may become a
dangerous destabilizing element in our society. The chant of "no justice,
no peace" reflects the frustration of people who feel that they are being
treated unfairly, and that they lack control over important issues in their
lives. The frustration of disenfranchisement can also cause social insta-
bility. The essence of due process is that the government should not act
arbitrarily towards its citizens. The community as a whole is harmed
when a substantial number of its citizens are subject to arbitrary treat-
ment by the government without effective redress.
In Part I of this article, I summarize the developments of the due
process revolution-and analyze the effect of the substantive and proce-
dural arguments on the Court's due process jurisprudence. In Part II, I
examine the practical and theoretical limits of the ability of the due proc-
ess revolution to better the lives of the poor and the disenfranchised. The
roots of the failings of the due process revolution, which has not brought
about the fairness that it promised and arguably has created a sterile bu-
reaucratic state, can be found in the Court's theoretical approach to due
process, which by its very nature is biased against the needs of the poor
29. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1996.
30. See infra notes 260-78 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., KEviN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR (1990); ROBERT B. REICH,
THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991).
32. See infra notes 288-311 and accompanying text.
33. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 327 n.12; Fallon, supra note 1, at 310, 322-23; Rutherford,
supra note 5, at 6.
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and the disenfranchised. Despite the shortcomings of its approach, how-
ever, the due process hearings for recipients of government benefits,
which resulted from the Court's Goldberg ruling, remain a significant
avenue of participation for poor people. In Part III of the article, I de-
scribe how the due process counterrevolution has limited the rights of
poor people to participate in all processes which affect their lives, from
the administrative realm to the legislative process, from the ability to
bring class actions to the ability to obtain effective representation by
counsel. In Part IV, I describe how the gap between the procedural rights
of the rich and poor has been widening as a result of the due process
counterrevolution, undermining the egalitarian underpinnings of the
Court's ruling in Goldberg. Even as the Court has restricted the proce-
dural rights of poor people on all levels, it has greatly expanded the
property rights of the affluent through the doctrine of compensation for
regulatory takings. Finally, in Part V of the article, I suggest that the
Court return to a communitarian approach to due process which would
be more responsive to the needs of the poor. I suggest that the Court
build on the "organic" approach of some of its earlier due process rul-
ings, and incorporate substantive notions of economic justice to enhance
the fairness of its rulings. It is essential that the Court adopt such an ap-
proach to reverse the disenfranchisement of the poor and foster a more
just and stable society.
II. THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court expanded the notion of
due process in a series of cases involving governmental benefits, con-
tracts and other programs. Those Court rulings, foremost of which is
Goldberg v. Kelly,3" are generally known as the due process revolution. 5
In Goldberg, the Court found welfare recipients constitutionally entitled
to trial-type hearings before the termination of their benefits. 6 In other
rulings, the Court expanded the notion of due process to encompass pris-
oners' rights,37 the rights of government employees,3" and the right to
34. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
35. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1973. Prior to Goldberg, the Court decided the case of King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), in which the Court struck down an Alabama statute that deemed the
income of any man with whom a woman was cohabiting to the household of that woman, as
violative of the Federal Social Security Act. Smith, 392 U.S. at 333. The Court's ruling that states
must follow uniform federal regulations governing the administration of welfare benefits was based
on the view that uniform treatment was more fair, and thus had procedural overtones. However, the
Court did not expressly cite the Due Process Clause as support for its opinion, and Smith is not
generally considered to be a procedural case.
36. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
37. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,555-56 (1974).
38. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1974) (holding that opportunity must be
given to justify a claim of entitlement to continue employment); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1974) (finding that, though not implicated in the case at hand, when one's reputation is at stake,
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avoid a state-imposed stigma to one's reputation.39 Through these rulings,
people of all classes benefitted from the due process revolution. How-
ever, the Goldberg decision heralded an increase in the procedural rights
of the poor, based in part on Charles Reich's expansive notions of the
property rights of the poor.
Charles Reich's theories were embraced by the Court in part be-
cause of the political mood of the times, characterized by a belief in the
power of government to transform society. ' Reich had argued, in effect,
that constitutional law discriminated against the poor by protecting only
the property of the rich." However, due process alone, even the expan-
sive, communitarian notion of process expressed by the Court in Gold-
berg, did not serve the function of redistributing economic resources. To
the extent that fairness is a component of the procedural rights estab-
lished by the Court in the due process revolution, it was limited to proce-
dural, not substantive fairness. As such, due process may be criticized for
attempting to mask the injustice in a capitalist society, especially since
the Court has been extremely reluctant to find substantive economic
rights in the Constitution. The benefits of the due process revolution for
poor people were limited by the individualist formalism of the Court's
rulings subsequent to Goldberg, and by the Court's unwillingness to find
substantive economic rights in other cases regarding welfare benefits.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The Court's ruling in Goldberg is arguably the closest that it came
to establishing a communitarian notion of process, which would be par-
ticularly beneficial to poor people. The ruling had two significant theo-
retical bases, which expanded the concept of process to benefit the poor-
est members of society. First, the Court expanded the definition of prop-
erty protected by the Due Process Clause to include the entitlement to
government benefits. ' By expanding the definition of protected property
and liberty interests, the Court extended individualist protections, previ-
ously enjoyed primarily by affluent and middle class owners of tradi-
tional property, to the meager and previously unprotected property inter-
ests of poor people. Second, the Court extended the notion of due process
to include pre-deprivation hearings. '3 That is, the property or liberty in-
terest could not be taken away without the owner first enjoying the right
procedural due process protections are required); see also Pierce, supra note 4, at 1978-79 (arguing
that Sindermann and Roth made it very difficult to fire government employees).
39. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
40. Pierce, supra note 4, at 1975-76.
41. Id. at 1975.
42. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
43. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65.
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to defend his interest in the property at a hearing." Because the public
benefits at issue were often the only significant property owned by the
claimants in these cases, pre-deprivation hearings were especially sig-
nificant.
The key to the due process revolution was the Court's expanded
definition of liberty and property rights that triggered protections. In
Goldberg, the Court recognized a property right in welfare benefits,
which had not previously been considered to be property.' Charles
Reich, whose work was cited by the Court in Goldberg, argued that those
benefits must be treated in the same way as traditional "old property,"
with the concomitant procedural protections.' Reich had argued that con-
stitutional law discriminated against the poor by protecting only the
property of the rich. Extending procedural protections to "new prop-
erty" would result in a more equitable system of justice, in which prop-
erty rights would be treated the same regardless of the property involved,
or the income of the owner of the property.'9 Reich's goal was to create a
governmental system that was fair to everyone.
The due process revolution also reached the more affluent members
of society as well as poorer recipients of government benefits. For exam-
ple, in Schware v. Board of Examiners, a precursor to Goldberg, the
Court held that an attorney could not be deprived of his license to prac-
tice law without a prior hearing.' In addition, all government employees
benefitted from the Court's rulings that the interest in a government job
was a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause,' and people
of all classes benefitted from the protection of their reputation.
The due process revolution was confined primarily to the adminis-
trative realm. However, the Court also expanded the constitutional right
to an opportunity to be heard in some civil cases. In Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp. of Bay View, the Court struck down a Wisconsin pre-
judgment wage garnishment procedure as violative of due process be-
cause it did not allow for any type of notice or hearing prior to an ad-
verse judgment. 2 Similarly, in Fuentes v. Shevin, the Court struck down
44. See id. at 264 (finding a due process right to pre-termination hearings for welfare
recipients); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969) (striking down a Wisconsin
prejudgment garnishment procedure as violative of due process).
45. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
46. Reich, The New Property, supra note 13, at 780-83.
47. Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 13, at 1255-56.
48. Reich defined the "new property" as the property rights created by the state in the form of
benefits and licenses. Reich, The New Property, supra note 13, at 739.
49. Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 13, at 1252-53.
50. 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); see also Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373
U.S. 96, 106 (1963) (finding applicant to Bar entitled to prior notice of grounds of his rejection).
51. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1978-79 (arguing that Roth and Sindermann made it very
difficult to fire government employees).
52. 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969).
19971
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
a Florida statute that allowed owners of leased property to obtain an or-
der of replevin, authorizing the sheriff to seize the property, without prior
notice and a hearing for the person who possessed the property." As a
practical matter, Sniadach and Fuentes affected the procedural rights of
poor people because it was they who most often suffered from abuse of
the state procedures in question." Moreover, poor people with less prop-
erty had more to lose than the more affluent people who had other prop-
erty interests to fall back on if they were deprived without a prior hear-
ing.
Finally, the fundamental right to be heard also was the basis for the
Court's ruling in Boddie v. Connecticut, where it found that indigent
plaintiffs in divorce suits had a constitutional right to a state procedure
for waiver of filing fees." In that case, the Court relied on both due proc-
ess and equal protection principles, pointing out that to deny plaintiffs an
in forma pauperis procedure would effectively deny them access to the
only process for terminating their marriage on the basis of their income
alone.' Subsequently, however, the Court found no due process violation
in the federal government's refusal to waive fees in bankruptcy cases in
the case of United States v. Kras," and the State of Oregon's refusal to
waive filing fees for administrative review appeals of welfare benefit
hearings in Ortwein v. Schwab!" In both of those cases, the Court distin-
guished its ruling from Boddie on the basis that Boddie implicated the
fundamental interest in a familial relationship, while Ortwein implicated
only the economic interests of the plaintiffs. 9 Thus, the Court's willing-
ness to find civil due process rights outside the administrative realm was
limited by its reluctance to find economic rights in the Constitution. This
reluctance paralleled the Court's reluctance to find substantive economic
rights in other realms that might have impacted on procedural rights.
B. Substance and Procedure in the Due Process Revolution
The Court's ruling in Goldberg was a victory in a campaign by wel-
fare rights activists and their lawyers to reform the system by which wel-
fare benefits were allocated.' The primary goal of the welfare rights ac-
tivists was to achieve substantive economic gains by establishing a con-
53. 407 U.S. 67,96(1972).
54. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340 ("A prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type is a
taking which may impose tremendous hardship on wage earners with families to support.").
55. 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971).
56. Boddie, at 375-76.
57. 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973).
58. 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973) (per curiam).
59. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 659; Kras, 409 U.S. at 450.
60. See generally MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 1960-1973 (1993) (discussing Goldberg's impact on the welfare rights movement);
FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOwARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY
SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 264-359 (1977) (discussing the welfare rights movement).
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stitutional right to a minimum income.' The legal strategy of advocating
for pre-termination fair hearings was seen as a means to achieve that
goal. 2 In Goldberg, the Court indicated that it might be receptive to ar-
guments for substantive economic rights with its broad based language of
equality. 3 However, in the subsequent case of Dandridge v. Williams, the
Court directly rejected a constitutional claim for economic rights." In
retrospect, procedural rights without substantive economic rights
achieved limited progress for poor people.
In Goldberg, the Court expressed an egalitarian view of process that
would encompass protections for all members of society, including wel-
fare recipients.' In his opinion, Justice Brennan stated that procedural
protections such as pre-termination hearings were essential both to sub-
stantive equality and to "foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within [this nation's] borders." Thus, the Court in Goldberg saw proce-
dural justice as "a normative horizon rather than a technical problem[,] '" 7
and expressed a view of due process that recognized its potential to foster
substantive equality in the procedural realm. This communitarian, egali-
tarian vision held out much promise to poor people, who had never bene-
fitted from procedural protections and were generally disenfranchised.
The Court's language indicated that the Court might also be willing to
find substantive economic rights in the Constitution, including the right
to a guaranteed minimum income or the constitutional right to welfare
benefits.' However, the Court rejected that concept directly in the case of
Dandridge v. Williams,' belying the promise of substantive justice in
Justice Brennan's Goldberg opinion.
From the beginning of the welfare rights movement, substantive and
procedural concerns were intertwined. The first goal of the welfare rights
activists was a substantive economic goal-to achieve the right to a
minimum income." At the same time, however, advocates for the poor
recognized that the poor were being treated with less dignity because of
their lack of economic resources. As Charles Reich said, recalling the
61. DAVIS, supra note 60, at 37.
62. Id. at 47.
63. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) ("From its founding the Nation's
basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.").
64. 397 U.S. 397,487 (1970).
65. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
66. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65.
67. White, supra note 65, at 3.
68. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265 ("Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means
to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity.'").
69. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486-87.
70. DAVIS, supra note 60, at 45. The first goal of the National Welfare Rights Organization
was "1. Adequate Income: A system that guarantees enough money for all Americans to live
dignified lives above the level of poverty." Id.
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insights that his research on caseworkers' investigative raids of the
houses of welfare recipients gave him for his writings on the nature of
property:
I began to see that [the functional view of property] had much more
profound implications than I'd first realized.... It was linked to
class; the lower on the totem pole you are, the fewer rights you have.
To have one rule for television licenses, for example, and another for
welfare violates principles of equality."
Similarly, the lawyers for the plaintiffs in Goldberg brought the case
in part to protect the substantive First Amendment rights of welfare
rights activists, who feared having their benefits terminated if they com-
plained to their case workers about their benefit levels or governing
regulations.'
Substantive economic gains would be meaningless if the state had
complete discretion to administer those gains. But process was also val-
ued in and of itself. After their experiences dealing with arbitrary welfare
case workers, welfare rights activists wanted formal protections from
governmental arbitrariness. Moreover, they wanted to be treated with
dignity and have the ability to participate in decisions affecting their
lives like other citizens." It soon became apparent that these formal pro-
cedural goals would be more easily obtained than substantive economic
changes. Indeed, gains in the procedural realm sometimes backfired,
resulting in substantive inequity, as in the case of the "special grants"
campaign by New York welfare activists. The "special grants" campaign,
which combined efforts at both substantive and procedural reforms, was
the chief organizational tool of the National Welfare Rights Organization
(NWRO). Under the New York state "special grants" program, welfare
recipients could apply for one time grants to pay for basic necessities
such as furniture and clothing. In the summer of 1967, NWRO organiz-
ers assisted welfare recipients in applying for those grants in an organ-
ized campaign. Denials were followed up by requests for fair hearings."
The goal of this campaign was both to obtain more benefits for those
who needed them, and to use the fair hearings system, which had almost
never been used before, to pressure state officials for reform.75 Ironically,
71. Id. at 85 (citing author interview with Charles Reich, Jan. 21, 1989).
72. See Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle:
A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 562-63 (1984).
But see White, supra note 65, at 18 ("Socially powerless speakers do not have the luxury of
confrontation ... ").
73. For example, three of the four goals of the National Welfare Rights Organization in 1967
were process-oriented goals: "2. Dignity: A system that guarantees recipients the full freedoms,
rights and respect of all American citizens. 3. Justice: A fair and open system that guarantees
recipients the full protection of the Constitution. 4. Democracy: A system that guarantees recipients
direct participation in the decisions under which they must live." DAVIS, supra note 60, at 45.
74. Id. at48.
75. Id. at 47; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 60, at 301-05.
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the State of New York responded to this "special needs" campaign by
creating a new system of smaller, flat grants which would be available to
all recipients.76 Although the new system reduced the benefit levels, it
was hard to oppose because it gave the appearance of fairness by concur-
rently reducing the discretion of welfare caseworkers." In this manner,
the state instituted procedural changes that appeared on their surface to
be more fair, but actually masked substantive injustice, turning the re-
formers' strategy on its head. The State of New York's response to the
"special needs" campaign illustrates how procedure without substance
can become meaningless formalism, harming rather than helping the
beneficiaries of that procedure. The state's action foreshadowed later
developments, as courts saw procedure in increasingly formalistic terms
that rendered it sterile and meaningless.
In Goldberg itself, the plaintiffs argued in favor of a substantive
right to welfare benefits along with procedural protections, noting in
their brief that without "the bare minimums essential for existence...
our expressed constitutional liberties become meaningless."78 The plain-
tiffs also raised substantive economic issues by telling stories of the
hardships that they suffered when they had their only means of liveli-
hood cut off for months while they waited for the appeals process.'
These stories of "brutal need" may have significantly moved the Court
toward its ultimate ruling in Goldberg.' Moreover, the language of the
Court's ruling in Goldberg indicated that the Court may have been
moved by more substantive economic arguments. In particular, Justice
Brennan referred to welfare benefits as "not mere charity, but a means to
'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselyes and our Posterity."' However, the hope that the Court might
find economic rights, as it had procedural ones, in the Constitution, was
short lived.
In the case of Dandridge v. Williams, the Court specifically rejected
the plaintiffs' attempt to establish a fundamental right to a minimum
76. DAVIS, supra note 60, at 53.
77. Id. at 53-54.
78. Brief for Appellees at 39, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (No. 62), cited in
DAVIS, supra note 60, at 104. One attorney for the plaintiffs, Ed Sparer, had argued that it was
imperative that Goldberg be used as a vehicle to establish a constitutional "right to live." DAVIS,
supra note 60, at 103-04. Sparer's insistence was based in part on a New York federal court decision
issued in another case handled by the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Rothstein v.
Wyman, 303 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Rothstein, the court came close to recognizing
welfare as a "fundamental right." Rothstein, 303 F. Supp. at 346-47; DAVIS, supra note 60, at 104.
The language in the plaintiff's brief was the result of a compromise between Sparer and his more
moderate colleague, Lee Albert, the director of the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law.
DAVIS, supra note 60, at 104.
79. See DAVIS, supra note 60, at 91-92 (emphasizing plaintiffs' plight in trial briefs); Id. at
109 (emphasizing plight of welfare recipients in oral argument before the Supreme Court).
80. See Brennan, supra note 17.
81. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65.
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income." The Court upheld a "family cap," imposed by the State of
Maryland, which capped the level of benefits for recipients so that the
level would not be increased if the recipient had more children. "3 Signifi-
cantly, the Court treated welfare legislation as an economic regulation
which triggered only minimal rational basis scrutiny, like a state's regu-
lation of business interests. ' The Court rejected arguments that welfare
regulations should be treated differently than other economic classifica-
tions because of the "brutal need" of the recipients, over Justice Mar-
shall's strident objections. ' Any remaining expectation that the Court
might recognize economic rights was dashed in the Court's opinion in
Wyman v. James." In that case, the Court analogized welfare benefits to
private charity when it held that welfare recipients had no right to refuse
access to caseworkers investigating their homes.'
Thus, the Court rejected the concept of substantive economic rights
which might have accompanied the procedural rights that it found in
Goldberg. More significantly, by applying a limited rational basis review
in Dandridge,' the Court relegated the fate of poor people to the whims
of state legislatures where they have little impact, and which are inher-
ently conservative because of the impact of money on the legislative
process." In Dandridge, the Court ignored its admonishment in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., that discrete and insular minorities re-
quire more protection from courts because of their lack of clout in the
legislative process, or it at least refused to recognize the poor as a dis-
crete and insular minority.' The Court's reasoning stems in large part
from its reluctance to apply notions of substantive due process to eco-
nomic regulations. In the previous three decades, the Court had shied
away from involving itself in the economy and disturbing the legislative
process.9' In Dandridge, the Court blindly applied the same rationale that
it applies to antitrust and commerce clause concepts to the concerns of
the poorest of the poor, unwilling to see the difference between regulat-
ing industry and allowing people meaningful control over their lives.
82. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
83. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 481.
84. Id. at 485.
85. See id. at 520, 522 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the case involved "the
literally vital interests of a powerless minority--poor families without breadwinners.... It is the
individual interests here at stake that .. most clearly distinguish this case from the 'business
regulation' equal protection cases.").
86. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
87. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 326.
88. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 385-86.
89. See infra Part V.E.
90. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
91. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (upholding an
Oklahoma statute, under rational basis review, that made it unlawful for any person not a licensed
optometrist or opthamologist to fit lenses, or replace or duplicate lenses).
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Dandridge was a significant blow to the gains achieved by poor
people in Goldberg and the other key cases of the due process revolution,
and signaled a halt to the progress of the poor in both the procedural and
substantive realms.' An undercurrent to all of the Court's rulings in cases
involving the procedural rights of the poor since Dandridge is its refusal
to find that class or income level is a suspect classification for the pur-
poses of equal protection analysis. The Court's failure to classify eco-
nomic interests as fundamental also precludes the Court from analyzing
the impact of procedural mechanisms with strict scrutiny.93 Because the
Court has refused to find poverty to be a suspect classification, and be-
cause of its reluctance to apply the principles of substantive due process,
many of the Court's rulings in favor of indigent petitioners in procedural
cases are based on a hybrid reasoning that informally combines due pro-
cess and equal protection principles to reach a result that comports with
the Court's view of fairness."4 However, these cases are few and far be-
tween, and have gotten lost in the Court's overall formalist approach to
process.
III. THE LIMITs OF THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION
As a practical matter, the due process revolution did not bring about
the justice that it promised. Instead, a bureaucratic state developed with
an elaborate appellate process that is alienating for many welfare recipi-
ents. The failures of the due process revolution can be traced back to the
Court's due process jurisprudence since Goldberg. The Court's formalist
approach is not responsive to the needs of the poor, and is arguably bi-
ased against them.
A. The Bureaucratic Welfare State
Ever since the Court's ruling in Goldberg, scholars have critically
analyzed the effect of the administrative state that grew out of the due
process revolution.9" The critiques fall into three general categories. First,
92. As such, Dandridge parallels the impact of Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), on
its efforts to desegregate public schools. In Milliken, the Court struck down a Detroit area
desegregation plan that would have required busing of students between urban and suburban school
districts to achieve racial parity. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 752-53. After Milliken, parents of white
children could avoid sending their children to integrated schools by moving to the suburbs. Thus, it
signaled the end of meaningful desegregation (as well as the end of decent urban public schools and
the decline of urban areas in general). See also Denise C. Morgan, What is Left to Argue in
Desegregation Law? The Right to Minimally Adequate Education, 8 HARV. BLACKLErER J. 99,
108 (1991) ("The Court's experimentation with integration, however, ended with Milliken v.
Bradley.") In Milliken, like Dandridge, the plaintiffs asked the Court to cross a line which it refused
to cross. The result of both cases was the halt of meaningful reform.
93. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 314-15 (stating that, in the due process analysis, fundamental
rights are subject to strict scrutiny, while non-fundamental rights merit only rational basis review).
94. See infra notes 321-24 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of
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many have criticized the cost of procedures, and advocated for limita-
tions on procedural protections for the sake of reducing those costs.'
This criticism has been accepted by the Court, and incorporated into its
due process jurisprudence." Second, others have critiqued the bureau-
cratic state that has resulted from implementing Goldberg's requirement
of pre-termination hearings.98 A third area of criticism is the argument
that the bureaucratic system seems to value process in and of itself, los-
ing sight of the importance of fairness and justice in our society." All of
these criticisms are related, and are a natural result of a system based on
process without substance.
Shortly after Goldberg, analysts voiced concern about the cost of
the procedural protections that the Court had mandated."m The cost of
process has always been a factor that weighs against the procedural
rights of the poor, who cannot afford to pay for their own procedural
protections. Since the state must always bear the cost of procedural pro-
tections for the poor, they will always be vulnerable to cost related cri-
tiques. Moreover, critics charge that money spent on procedural meas-
ures administering benefits reduces the amount of money available to
recipients of those benefits.' According to this zero sum critique, proce-
dure and substance are in direct competition with each other. The Court
specifically rejected this argument in its ruling in Goldberg.2 However,
the Court tacitly accepted the argument that procedure was too costly in
its subsequent ruling in Mathews v. Eldridge, and incorporated this criti-
cism into the due process calculation. 3
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNIELL L. REV. 772 (1974) [hereinafter Mashaw, Management Side];
Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 731 (1990) [hereinafter Reich, Beyond the New Property]; William H. Simon, The Rule of Law
and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 777 (1990) [hereinafter Simon,
Rule of Law]; William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE
L.J. 1198 (1983) [hereinafter Simon, Legality]. The Court's ruling in Goldberg was codified in the
regulations governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1994),
and other government benefit programs. The fair hearing requirement as codified at 42 U.S.C §
602(a)(4). However, the AFDC program and all of its governing regulations were abolished by
Congress in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
96. See Mashaw, Management Side, supra note 95.
97. See Mathews v. Elderidge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
98. See Simon, Rule of Law, supra note 95, at 785; Simon, Legality, supra note 95, at 1215-
16.
99. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
100. Mashaw, Management Side, supra note 95, 804-24 (analyzing, among other things, the
cost of procedures).
101. See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284 (1970) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("[N]ew
layers of procedural protection may become an intolerable drain on the very funds earmarked for
food, clothing and other living essentials.").
102. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
103. 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976). See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1981 (stating that the Mathews
balancing test was a response to the cost of process).
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In Mathews, the plaintiff was a recipient of Social Security benefits
who suffered from back pain and chronic anxiety.'" His benefits were
terminated by the state agency without a prior hearing, and he sued,
claiming that the state action violated his due process rights. In order to
determine the extent to which he was entitled to pre-termination hear-
ings, the Court established a three part balancing test to determine how
much process is due to recipients of government benefits. According to
the Mathews test, the state must balance the private interest which will be
affected by the government action and the risk of erroneous deprivation
of such interests through the procedures used, and the government's in-
terest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens which would result
from additional procedural protections.'" The Court rejected the egali-
tarian nature of Goldberg and focused instead on an individualistic,
utilitarian approach to process.'" In Mathews, the Court pitted process
against substance, setting up a contest that the poor were likely to lose.
A second area of criticism of the Goldberg approach to process fo-
cuses on its effect on the day to day administration of public benefits. As
a result of the due process revolution, the administration of government
benefits became more uniform and less discretionary. The resulting bu-
reaucracy has been criticized by many as being both sterile and ineffec-
tive."° Charles Reich has argued that once attention was focused on pro-
cedure, reformers became preoccupied with the cost of procedure and
overlooked the substantive question of individual need.'" For example,
many of the intrusive social workers who worked for welfare admini-
strations prior to Goldberg were replaced by bureaucratic functionaries
who had little training in meeting the needs of the poor and would simply
follow administrative regulations."0 The individual caseworker still
makes most decisions on each welfare recipient's case and the system of
appeals plays only a limited role in assuring that he or she makes correct
decisions."' Moreover, the appeals system is too daunting for many re-
104. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 324 n.2.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 335.
107. See Rutherford, supra note 5, at 48-49 (maintaining that a focus on the cost of process
"subtly shift(s) the focus of due process from protecting the powerless to serving social utility as
defined by the powerful").
108. See Simon, Rule of Law, supra note 95; Simon, Legality, supra note 95.
109. See Reich, Beyond the New Property, supra note 95, at 737 (arguing in favor of finding
substantive economic rights in the Constitution).
110. See Simon, Rule of Law, supra note 95, at 785; Simon, Legality, supra note 95, at 1215-16
("Educational requirements were reduced and efforts were made to recruit people who did not aspire
to status or responsibility beyond clerical work.").
I 11. See Simon, Rule of Law, supra note 95, at 785. Although the system of appeals may serve
as an incentive for caseworkers to make correct decisions so that they will not be overturned on
appeal, they may also serve as a disincentive for some caseworkers, who know that any mistake they
make can be corrected through an appeal.
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cipients of governmental benefits who lack representation to utilize it."2
"The fair procedures articulated by the Courts have become a
labyrinth""' 3 with devastating effects on those who are dependent upon it,
and must navigate it for their livelihood.
Finally, others criticize the notion of process itself as empty for-
malism, bereft of the moral guidance needed to bring about justice in our
society. In the bureaucratic welfare state, the humanist vision of Gold-
berg seems to be lost in the way "in which procedural rituals are actually
played out.""' Under this view, process serves to alienate, rather than
empower, poor people. For example, formalized rules may intimidate
recipients of benefits because they are both complex and constantly in
flux, increasing the possibility that their benefits may .be terminated by
mistake for reasons that are not readily apparent to them."' Moreover, the
alienating nature of the government bureaucracy may cause it to become
a vehicle for gender and class subordination of people who are histori-
cally disenfranchised and subordinated because the bureaucracy reflects
the stratification of society at large."6 From this perspective, process has
completely lost its substantive underpinnings and has become disengaged
from any mechanism that might serve to create the fair society that it
once promised.
Ironically, formal procedural rights may hurt rather than help poor
people because they serve to mask substantive injustice. For example, the
elaborate system of "fair hearings" implies that justice can be achieved
through the use of those hearings.'" However, this is not necessarily the
case, especially for unrepresented recipients. Thus, process has become
part of the problem to the extent that it has become a means to legitimate
a system that is fundamentally unfair."' Recent welfare reforms have
drastically decreased benefit levels by creating, among other things, five
112. See Susan D. Bennett, "No Relief But Upon the Terms of Coming Into the House"-
Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter System, 104
YALE L.J. 2157, 2157-82 (1995) (describing in detail the discouraging process of homeless people in
Washington D.C. applying and waiting for government assistance).
113. See Sparer, supra note 72, at 561.
114. White, supra note 65, at 4.
115. Id.at 35.
116. Id. at 41. See generally Gerald F. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1276 (1984) (criticizing the varying definitions of bureaucracy as a mechanism of
deception).
117. See Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694, 708-09 (1980) (reviewing
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CoNSTrrtrrONAL LAW (1978)) (maintaining that Goldberg
diminished the forces of equality "by deflecting them into a fruitless struggle against a bureaucracy
that readily swallowed the Court-prescribed dose of due process without any change in symptoms,
and second by bolstering the idea that fairness was not far away in the American welfare state").
118. For example, the bias of the decision maker remains a factor that may be masked by
formal process. See generally Elaine Golin, Note, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1532 (1995) (detailing bias in administrative
adjudications).
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year lifetime caps on the receipt of benefits, and imposing work require-
ments and other restrictions on all welfare recipients."' It has been argued
that due process is necessary to enforce those restrictions "fairly.' 2"
However, an equally persuasive argument can be made that those provi-
sions are so substantively unfair that no amount of process can make
them so. '
Reliance on sterile process rather than moral reasoning may result in
a system that is even more unjust, rather than furthering the interests of
justice. In modem society, the reliance on formalism allows decision
makers to sidestep moral dilemmas and avoid issues of substantive in-
justice.'" Because they rely on formal doctrines such as precedent,
"judges do not sufficiently focus on the values needed for a meaningful
dispensation of justice.'"" Similarly, decision makers may follow formal
procedural doctrines rather than being forced to make decisions that are
morally correct. Of course, the goal of process is to enable decision mak-
ers to make decisions that are morally correct. However, rights may be-
come rarified and abstracted to the point where they lose all meaning.'2
If so, process may become an impediment to achieving a just society,
rather than a means to achieve it.
The foregoing discussion indicates that, at the very least, procedure
without substance cannot be a goal in and of itself." Yet, the bureau-
cratic welfare state is based on a cost conscious approach which pits sub-
stantive values against procedure. The resulting bureaucracy fails to meet
the needs of poor people and may serve to further alienate them instead.
The current system of due process rights has not established, indeed can-
not establish, the just society envisioned by those who brought Goldberg.
119. See Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 103(7)(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2137
(5 year cap); § 824, 110 Stat. at 2323 (work requirements).
120. See Alan W. Houseman, The Vitality of Goldberg v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy in the
1990s, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 831, 846-47, 853 (1990); Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1129-30.
121. See White, supra note 65, at 42 (arguing that welfare has reflected and sustained women's
subordination). See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare
"Reform," 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 287 (1996) (arguing that welfare reform has furthered, rather
than reduced, women's subordination).
122. Phillip J. Closius, Rejecting the Fruits of Action: The Regeneration of the Wasteland's
Legal System, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 127,131 (1995).
123. Id. at 131.
124. See Sparer, supra note 72, at 562.
125. For example, even advocates for due process would not want the full panoply of
procedural protections, including a right to appear in civil court for judicial review on the first
review of any administrative decision terminating welfare benefits. That process would be too time
consuming and complicated. Aside from the court congestion that it would cause, the process would
also be a burden for welfare recipients. They would have to wait too long to get a decision, and
might feel overwhelmed by the procedural trappings of a civil court case.
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B. The Limits of Formalism
Many of the effects of the due process revolution that have been
criticized above flow naturally from the limits of the formalism with
which the Court has approach procedural due process issues since Gold-
berg. The Court uses a two-pronged approach to procedural due process
issues. First, the Court determines whether the plaintiff has any liberty or
property right at stake. If so, the Court then determines how much proc-
ess is warranted, applying the three part test of Mathews v. Eldridge.'2"
The approach that the Court has adopted, which requires a state or fed-
eral statute to recognize a positive liberty or property right before any
protections are triggered in the first prong of its analysis, is fundamen-
tally biased against the less privileged because it requires someone to
have a right to something before they are entitled to any process, and
because the courts are more willing to recognize the substantive rights of
the rich than those of the poor. In addition, the Court's approach to de-
termining how much process is due, the second step, does not adequately
account for the principles of fairness and equality, which are essential for
a meaningful due process jurisprudence.
In Roth v. Board of Regents, the Court laid out the guidelines for
determining whether a property or liberty interest is at stake. '27. A prop-
erty or liberty interest does not stem from a person's "unilateral expecta-
tion" of that benefit. 28 Rather, that person has an identifiable interest only
if she can establish that she has "a legitimate claim or entitlement" to it.'1
9
In order to determine whether an individual has a claim to entitlement,
courts should look to "outside sources such as state law."'3" If there is no
entitlement, then there is no constitutional requirement to procedural
protections.
As a result of the Court's ruling in Roth, all individuals who seek
due process protections must peruse state law and other sources to prove
that they are entitled to some property or liberty interest as a preliminary
step to make their case."' Courts become mired in the formal questions
interpreting state statutes to determine whether they have created a lib-
erty or property interest. Along the way, courts lose sight of what is
126. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
127. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
128. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. For examples of innovative approaches to proving a property interest in order to convince
courts that process is still due in a block grant era, see John Bouman, Due Process For Welfare
Recipients Subject to Changing Program Rules: An Illinois Case Study, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., June
1996, at 112-13; and Nancy Morawetz, A Due Process Primer: Litigating Government Benefit Cases
in the Block Grant Era, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., June 1996, at 98-100.
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really at issue---the fairness of the state's treatment of the individual.' 2
Moreover, the process generates anomalous results. As Jerry Mashaw
has noted, "[iut is a 'strange constitution' that protects hobby kits and the
right to dispute one's water bill," but not nursing home residents who
object to being moved from one nursing home to another.'33 The Court's
positivist approach has been criticized by scholars both because it is
relativistic, and because it leaves people subject to the whims of state
legislatures.'" In fact, some judges and scholars have argued that state
legislatures are free to limit procedural protections in substantive legisla-
tion without any constitutional restrictions.' Other scholars have argued
that notions of property and contract must have a core of federal consti-
tutional meaning.'"
The Court's positivist approach is positivist because it depends on
the state to create a positive liberty or property interest. It is arguably
biased by nature against the poor and the disempowered. The relegation
of procedural rights to state legislatures would harm the interests of poor
people because of the importance of money in the legislative process.
Even more significant, as Mashaw has pointed out, positive law grants
no substantive rights when no standards exist for exercising administra-
tive discretion.'37 That is because, after the language of Roth, courts must
carefully analyze the language of a statute to determine whether a bene-
ficiary had a reasonable expectation of entitlement. When a system of
government benefits allows the state complete discretion in its admini-
stration, a reasonable person has no expectation of an entitlement.'
Thus, people with less political power are less likely to have their inter-
ests determined to be entitlements by courts.
132. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of Liberal Democratic
Citizenship, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 433, 434 (1987) [hereinafter Mashaw, Dignitary Process].
133. Id. at 437.
134. See Farina, supra note 1, at 197-201; Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v.
Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 805, 813-14 (1990); Mashaw, Dignitary Process, supra
note 132, at 437-38; Reich, Beyond the New Property, supra note 95, at 732.
135. This "bitter with the sweet" theory, put forth by Justice Rehnquist and Judge Easterbrook
takes the positivist approach to its logical conclusion. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 335; Pierce,
supra note 4, at 1986-87. Under that theory, state legislatures may link substantive benefits with
limits on procedural protections. That is, beneficiaries of state benefits must take the "bitter" (lack of
process) with the "sweet" (govemment benefit). Pierce, supra note 4, at 1986-87. Such an approach
would be completely antithetical to the notion of process and participation as a dignitary value, with
fairness as a goal in and of itself. Id. ("Acceptance of the 'bitter with the sweet' theory would have
constituted clear, if implicit, repudiation of the entire due process revolution."). The theory was
rejected by the Court in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985).
However, it retains the support of some justices and member of the academy. See generally Pierce,
supra note 4, at 1986-95.
136. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 329.
137. Mashaw, Dignitary Process, supra note 132, at 438.
138. See Colson v. Sillman, 35 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that applicants for
children's health benefits provided by the state had no due process rights because the state statute
provided for benefits only within the limitations of funds appropriated for the program, and thus the
benefits were not entitlements).
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Moreover, the entitlement approach is fundamentally biased against
the poor because it requires the existence of a property or liberty right
before an entitlement to process can be found. "In short, the Court's en-
titlement analysis, grounded in positive law prescriptions, causes due
process protection to drop out of the Constitution when needed most."'
39
Therefore, the first step of the Court's due process jurisprudence is fun-
damentally flawed in its ability to provide process for the poor and the
disenfranchised.
The second step of the Court's due process reasoning, the balancing
test of Mathews v. Eldridge,'" is also weighted against the interests of the
poor and the disenfranchised. In the Mathews test, courts pit the state's
interests against those of the individual seeking procedural protections.
The test is weighted in the state's favor because providing due process
will always be costly to the state, so the state will have an interest in not
providing procedural protections, and because the property interest of
any individual poor person will be small. It also harms poor people in
particular because they cannot afford to buy procedural protections. For
example, they cannot afford to hire a lawyer to help them enforce their
rights.
Moreover, equality is not taken into account in determining the pro-
cedural protections required by constitutional provisions of due process.
Thus, the Court could find that welfare recipients were entitled to pre-
termination hearings in Goldberg, and later find that recipients of Social
Security benefits, many of whom also depend on their benefits for sur-
vival, were not entitled to pre-termination hearings in Mathews.''
Moreover, the Mathews approach pits beneficiaries against each other
because it is premised on the notion that the state will pay for procedural
protections with money that would otherwise have been allocated for
benefits. 2 Finally, the Mathews balancing test leads naturally to a sterile
bureaucracy. State agencies are allowed to mathematically compute how
much process they will provide rather than determining what procedures
would be the most fair, or the most likely to reach the correct result, and
have no incentive to design procedures leading to such results. Therefore,
those who are most dependent on those processes-the recipients of gov-
ernmental benefits-have the most to lose under the balancing test.
C. The Resonance of Goldberg
Despite all of its limitations, on both the practical and theoretical
level, Goldberg and its progeny are still meaningful for the poor and
139. Mashaw, Dignitary Process, supra note 132, at 438.
140. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
141. The Court has been criticized for relying on speculative factual reasoning in Mathews
because, in fact, many Social Security recipients do rely on their benefits as the sole source of
income. See Reich, Beyond the New Property, supra note 95, at 732.
142. Rutherford, supra note 5, at 50.
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their advocates. Because courts, legislatures and administrators are often
not receptive to the substantive claims of the poor, individual hearings
are an important arena for advocacy." 3 The right to be treated with dig-
nity is still a value in and of itself, and it remains one of the few rights
that poor people can enforce, usually with the help of representatives, in
administrative hearings. The value of procedure in and of itself is of par-
ticular concern when those affected belong to a historically disadvan-
taged and disempowered group, especially women and members of racial
and ethnic minority groups.
Of all the reforms achieved by welfare rights activists in the 1960s,
the right to due process hearings from Goldberg may be the only one to
remain active and vital.'" Because courts recently have not been as re-
ceptive to impact litigation as they were in the past, advocates have re-
sorted to individual hearings to vindicate their clients' rights. ' Adminis-
trative process provides one of the few avenues of redress for advocates
for the poor.'" Of course, procedural protections are no substitute for
substantive economic rights. However, when poor people bring substan-
tive claims, they nearly always threaten the power structure since eco-
nomic issues are implicated by necessity. As the Supreme Court has
failed to find economic rights in the Constitution, poor people must use
their procedural rights to glean what they can from the system, even if
the system is fundamentally unjust.
Moreover, the notion of formal rights continues to resonate for the
poor and the disenfranchised."a For example, in the civil rights move-
ment, people risked their lives (and sometimes lost them) in the fight for
the formal right to vote. Prior to Goldberg, poor people had virtually no
rights, procedural or otherwise.' One of the highest priorities of the Na-
tional Welfare Rights Organization was for all people to be treated with
143. See Houseman, supra note 120, at 835; Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1129-39.
144. See Houseman, supra note 120, at 832-33 (stating that the substantive reform cases such as
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), no longer provide a framework for advocates for the poor).
However, Goldberg itself is now in jeopardy after the enactment of the recent welfare reform bill.
See infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
145. Houseman, supra note 120, at 835; see Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1115-16 (discussing that
legal services attorneys spend much of their time representing clients at individual hearings). In
particular, impact litigation advocating for welfare reform has been a target of recent Congressional
action as members of Congress were annoyed by the attempts of advocates for the poor to influence
welfare reform policy.
146. Houseman, supra note 120, at 836.
147. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 314-15 (1987) (finding informal process to
have negative impact on minorities); Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studues
and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 390-91 (1987) (identifying need for structure in
identifying and eliminating racism); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals
from Reconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 408 (1987) (commenting on need for
formal legal processes to assure rights).
148. Law, supra note 134, at 806.
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dignity, rather than contempt and patronization, by the state workers with
which they came into contact. 9
Studies show that people who are disenfranchised are correct in
valuing formal procedures." ° Decision makers are less likely to act on
prejudice if they are constrained by formal procedures."' Therefore, peo-
ple who have faced historical discrimination, including women, people
of color and poor people, have more to gain from formal procedures.
Process also may serve as a means of empowerment for the disempow-
ered. A formal hearing allows a person an arena in which to voice her
concerns and air her grievances."2 Moreover, process can serve as a
means to balance power."3 Procedural protections are designed to limit
power imbalances by allowing people to participate in decisions that
affect their lives."" Finally, as the opportunity to participate is essential to
one's identity as a citizen, we must not overlook the importance of that
opportunity to preserve the dignity of all of our citizens, regardless of
their race, gender, ethnicity or income level.
IV. THE DUE PROCESS COUNTERREVOLUTION
In recent years, this country has undergone a due process counter-
revolution, in which courts and legislatures have restricted the due proc-
ess rights that they once had expanded thirty years ago."5' Just as the due
process revolution was most beneficial to the economically underprivi-
leged, it is the poor and the disenfranchised who are losing their rights in
149. See supra note 73. Similarly, feminists seem drawn to procedural issues and protections as
a means of empowerment for women, who have historically been disempowered. See Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U. CtN. L. REV. 1223 (1993).
150. I have addressed this issue at length in my earlier work, Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1114-
21.
151. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1387-89 (stating that without procedural
formalities, decision makers are more likely to be swayed by prejudice); Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (stating that poorer parties are disadvantaged in the
bargaining process because of their limited resources to finance litigation).
152. In her Sunday Shoes article, Lucie White tells the story of her representation of a client in
a welfare hearing who appears to be overwhelmed and confused by the formal process of the
hearing. White, supra note 65. White is effective in pointing out the limits of the effectiveness of
procedure as an empowering structure. Id. However, White's story, rather than proving the
disempowering nature of procedure, shows how it can be effective as a means of empowerment. By
White's own account, her client was happy with the hearing and felt that she was able to tell her
story. Id. at 31. Moreover, although she lost the formal appeal, she won her case when the county
welfare department dropped the overpayment charge against her. Id. at 32.
153. Rutherford, supra note 5, at 5.
154. See Fiss, supra note 151, at 1077-78 (pointing out that one goal of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is to lessen the impact of distributional inequalities through the use of formal
procedures).
155. See generally MASHAW, supra note 1, at 29-41 (suggesting the costs of increased citizen
access to administrative hearings has driven courts to rethink participation rights granted in the early
1970s); Pierce, supra note 4 (stating that after a relatively stable post-revolution period from 1978-
1994, recent developments foreshadow a due process counterrevolution).
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the counterrevolution. In the administrative realm, the counterrevolution
manifests itself in the Court's cutting back on what constitutes a liberty
or property interest that triggers due process,'" and in reducing the pro-
cedural protections that are constitutionally required.' Moreover, federal
and state legislatures are reducing the procedural rights of recipients of
government benefits by redefining some governmental benefits as lack-
ing entitlement status, and therefore as "non-property.
The due process counterrevolution in the administrative sphere will
severely affect the ability of the poor to participate in decisions which
will affect their lives. In addition, recent developments which encompass
a broader notion of process will also serve to further disenfranchise the
poor. For example, other related developments in the procedural realm of
civil procedure, including amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23, will restrict the ability of the poor to bring class actions to vin-
dicate their rights. Restrictions on Legal Services Corporation (LSC)
activities signal a significant decline in the procedural rights of the eco-
nomically disadvantaged, and cuts in funding for the LSC threaten to
deprive poor people of the primary access that they have to an attorney,
further limiting their ability to participate effectively in decisions that
affect their lives. Finally, the Court's interpretation of the First Amend-
ment in election finance cases virtually insures that poor people will have
little or no say in the political process. All of these developments have an
impact on the ability of the poor to exert control over their own destinies,
and implicate the right to participate in a broader sense than that tradi-
tionally referred to as procedural. "9 Moreover, they illustrate the in-
creasing disenfranchisement of the poor in almost every aspect of their
lives. Therefore, the author considers them to be essential aspects of the
due process counterrevolution.
A. The Administrative Counterrevolution
The Supreme Court began its retreat from the due process revolu-
tion before it was even complete." By 1978, the Court had issued nine
opinions that reduced the scope of due process protections required by
the Constitution.'' Moreover, the Court limited the scope of interests
triggering due process protections in cases involving harm to one's
156. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
157. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986).
158. The most significant development in this realm is the new Transitional Aid to Needy
Families program of the Welfare Reform Act, which specifically defines welfare benefits as lacking
entitlement status. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
159. For example, neither Mashaw nor Pierce refer to these developments in their discussion of
a due process counterrevolution. See generally Pierce, supra note 4; MASHAW, supra note 1, at 29-
41.
160. Pierce, supra note 4, at 1973.
161. Id. at 1973 & n.2.
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reputation,'62 and in the context of regulatory proceedings.'63 In several
other opinions, the Court held that the Constitution did not require a full
Goldberg-style hearing before benefits could be terminated, but could be
satisfied by an informal paper review prior to governmental action.'" The
most significant of these cases, however, is Mathews v. Eldridge,"" in
which the Court rejected the broad-based ideological vision of its Gold-
berg opinion in favor of a utilitarian approach, which principally re-
flected a concern about the cost of procedural protections." As noted
above, Mathews set the stage for a due process regime in which poor
people are by nature likely to be under served. In a series of cases, the
Court has also cut back on what procedural protections are required in
the context of claims brought under the primary civil rights statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, for compensation sought as redress for denials of process.
Recent Supreme Court rulings have limited the ability of plaintiffs
to bring procedural due process claims under section 1983. These rulings
reflect the Court's impatience with the number of such claims that re-
sulted from the due process revolution. For example, in Parran v. Tay-
lor, the Court limited the ability of plaintiffs to recover under section
1983 from the lack of pre-deprivation process to protect from the "ran-
dom and unauthorized acts" of government officials.'67 In Sandin v. Con-
ner, the Court limited the ability of a prisoner to recover under section
1983 for actions of prison officials which arguably violated his proce-
dural rights.'" Both cases can be seen as nothing more than the Court's
attempt to curb section 1983 actions when other procedural remedies
were available. However, the cases also may have repercussions that
further undermine the constitutionally required procedural rights in the
administrative context.
In Parratt, the plaintiff was a prisoner whose hobby kit was lost by
the prison employees in the mail room.' Although he could have
brought a post-deprivation state court action in tort, he decided instead to
file a section 1983 action in federal court, alleging violation of his due
process rights by prison officials because he was denied a pre-
162. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976) (holding that government action which
stigmatizes triggers a property interest only if that stigma denies a state-protected right, and loss of
reputation is not such a right).
163. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1984.
164. See id. at 1983.
165. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
166. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1982 ("The dramatically different tone of the opinion in
Eldridge, however, seemed to send a message that Goldberg, and its welfare context, represented the
high water mark for the procedures the Court would require before the government could deprive an
individual of an interest protected by due process.").
167. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
168. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
169. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 529-30.
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deprivation remedy.'" The Court found that pre-deprivation process is
not constitutionally required when it is not feasible, and when the person
affected has sufficient post-deprivation remedies.'7 ' The Court held that a
state need not provide pre-deprivation procedures to guard against "ran-
dom and unauthorized acts" by the state.'"
The Court's ruling in Parratt may be nothing more than simply cre-
ating an abstention doctrine encouraging plaintiffs to use state tort reme-
dies.'" However, at the very least, Parratt places the burden on plaintiffs
to prove the constitutional inadequacy of a state's remedies.' 7' The Par-
ran Court appeared to condone random and unauthorized government
acts by holding that it would be too difficult to provide pre-deprivation
remedies for those acts. If so, Parratt represents a significant barrier to
establishing due process protections when they are arguably needed the
most.' For example, in the case of Clifton v. Shaffer, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit relied on Parratt when it found that a
plaintiff who suffered a two month deprivation of his welfare benefits
because of a mistake made by his caseworker did not state a due process
claim under section 1983 because the caseworker's act was random and
unauthorized. 6 When interpreted in this manner, the Parratt doctrine
means that due process does not protect against the most arbitrary and
unfair state action.
The Court's recent decision in Sandin v. Conner also may be a sig-
nificant development in the due process counterrevolution.'" In that case,
the Court put severe limits on what could be considered to be the defini-
tion of a liberty interest, finding that a prisoner is deprived of a liberty
interest only when the state's action imposes an "atypical or significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the normal incidents of prison
life."'' The Court found that the plaintiff's thirty days in solitary con-
finement was not "atypical" or "significant" enough to implicate a liberty
interest.'" Thus, the Court severely limited the scope of what a prisoner
could claim as a "liberty" interest.
Most importantly, in Sandin the Court appears to have created a
third hurdle for persons attempting to bring due process claims-a hurdle
170. Id. at 543-44.
171. Id. at 538.
172. Id. at 541.
173. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 345-51.
174. Id. at 356.
175. See Morawetz, supra note 131, at 103.
176. 969 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1992). The plaintiff in Clifton had also filed an administrative
appeal, which eventually resulted in the restoration of his benefits. Clifton, 969 F.2d at 280.
However, he was left without compensation for the damages that he incurred during the two months
in which he was without benefits due to the error of his caseworker.
177. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
178. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
179. Id. at 486.
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of "importance."'" The Court's ruling in Sandin is presently confined to
prisoners' rights cases, and the Court's reluctance to find a liberty inter-
est for an incarcerated individual, as well as its regard for the state's in-
terest in security,8 ' were obvious factors in this case. Nevertheless,
Sandin may have significant repercussions in all administrative due pro-
cess contexts.' 2 The "importance" threshold may be particularly prob-
lematic for poor people because the amount of property or liberty at issue
in any particular due process claim almost always will be small enough
to enable courts to find that their interest is simply not important enough,
thus further undermining procedural due process protections to the poor
and the disenfranchised. Moreover, it completely sidesteps the issue of
fairness. The Court's reasoning in Sandin seems to imply that the Con-
stitution will tolerate unfairness as long as the courts do not deem the
unfairness to be important.' 3
B. The End of Goldberg?
Most significantly for the poorest of the poor, the welfare reform
bill recently enacted by Congress encourages states to .test the validity of
Goldberg itself.'" In that statute, Congress abolished the New Deal-era
program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and replaced it
with a new program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF).'8" This law states emphatically that welfare benefits are no
longer entitlements.'" Since the new welfare benefits are no longer enti-
tlements, the Court might find that they no longer trigger due process
protections. Therefore, welfare beneficiaries may no longer be constitu-
tionally entitled to pre-termination hearings, or to any other due process
protections.
In Goldberg, the Court glossed *over the issue of whether the plain-
tiffs had a protected property interest, noting only that benefits were
statutory entitlements.'87 In Board of Regents v. Roth, the Court further
clarified that a person is entitled to benefits only if he or she can demon-
strate "a legitimate claim of entitlement" to them, grounded in statutory
180. See Morawetz, supra note 131, at 98.
181. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
182. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1989 (stating that Sandin may be the first of a series of
counterrevolutionary decisions).
183. Moreover, the Court in Sandin appeared to place a high threshold on importance when it
found that thirty days of solitary confinement was not "important" enough to merit constitutional
protection. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
184. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1976, 1989-9W, Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1126-27.
185. The Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
186. Id. § 401.
187. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 263 n.8 (1970) (characterizing welfare benefits
as statutory entitlements for those eligible and "welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than a
'gratuity.').
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law or other sources.'" After Roth, it appears that discretionary programs
probably do not trigger due process protections.' For example, in the
case of Colson v. Sillman, the court found that no due process protections
were warranted for recipients of state funded children's medical benefits
because the statute defining the program stated that their availability de-
pended on money being appropriated for them.'" Under the new welfare
statute, states may run out of money because states also are not entitled
to federal money with which to pay for benefits.'"' Therefore, states may
link the right to welfare benefits on appropriations, creating contingent
entitlements similar to those at issue in Colson. The TANF program,
while giving a large amount of discretion to states, also goes a step fur-
ther by emphatically stating that benefits are not entitlements.'92 Given
the Court's ruling in Roth, and Congress' clear intentions, it is unlikely
that the Court would find an entitlement to welfare benefits if it were to
decide Goldberg today. Without such a property interest to trigger pro-
tections, it is unlikely that the Court would find any constitutional re-
quirement to process for welfare recipients under its current mode of
analysis.
The TANF program delegates wide discretion to states in establish-
ing and administering welfare programs.'93 Several states have taken the
hint from Congress, and restricted the procedural rights of beneficiaries
and applicants to their welfare programs.' 4 Both Wisconsin and Michi-
gan, considered to be pioneering states in welfare reform issues, have
taken steps to reduce the due process rights of welfare recipients. Under
the new "Wisconsin Works" (W-2) program, the administering agency,
the Department of Workforce Development (DWD), is only required to
review agency decisions that involve the denial of an application based
solely on the determination of financial eligibility.'9" On all other matters,
the DWD is not required to review the local agency's decision, although
188. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972). The Court noted that its decision
in Goldberg was triggered by the fact that welfare recipients "had a claim of entitlement to welfare
payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them." Id.
189. See Morawetz, supra note 131, at 104. However, welfare recipients might still be entitled
to procedural protections from government action that is completely arbitrary, such as the denial of
benefits based on eye color or hat size. See generally Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951); Fallon, supra note 1 (discussing procedural protections of the due process
clause against arbitrary decisions by the government).
190. 35 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1994). But see Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453, 462 (7th Cir.
1984) (alluding that establishment of eligibility is contingent on availability of resources as
establishing an entitlement).
191. See Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1127.
192. The Welfare Reform Act § 401.
193. The Welfare Reform Act § 401.
194. These measures will almost certainly be subject to challenge on constitutional grounds,
and may be found to be unconstitutional by the courts. Such a challenge would give the Supreme
Court the opportunity to reinterpret its Goldberg ruling. See infra Part VII.
195. WIS. STAT. § 49.152(1) (1996).
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it is authorized to do so.'" There is no requirement to continue benefits
while an appeal is pending under the W-2 dispute resolution process.
Thus, the state of Wisconsin is disregarding the essentials of the Gold-
berg ruling. Moreover, the review need not include the bedrocks of due
process-prior notice and the opportunity for a hearing."' Rather, the W-
2 program allows only for a "review" by the agency or the DWD, and
prompt review and notification are not specifically required.'98
Similarly, in Michigan, the Family Independence Agency (FIA) has
proposed regulations that would allow the agency to close or reduce as-
sistance at the time when notice of the proposed action is sent.'" The
regulation would eliminate the procedural protections of advance notice
and pre-termination hearings.' Moreover, the Administrative Law
Judges (ALJs) who conduct the hearings are now strictly limited as to
what they can determine in the hearings. AIJs have no authority to make
decisions on constitutional grounds, overrule statutes, overrule promul-
gated regulations or overrule or make exceptions to the agency policy set
out in program manuals."' Any such issues must be referred to a review
board known as the Policy Hearing Authority. These regulations will
make it difficult for welfare recipients to win any constitutional, statu-
tory, or policy arguments at their hearings. Like the restrictions on LSC
attorneys, their obvious if unstated purpose is to stifle the participation of
welfare recipients with regard to any policy issues that may have an im-
pact on a larger number of people.'
196. Id. § 49.152.
197. Id. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (stating
that "[m]any controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause but there can be no doubt that.., deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing").
198. Wis. STAT. § 49.152(2). The lack of a requirement for prompt review is particularly
significant given the fact that benefits need not be provided while one is awaiting review. This issue
was one of the bases for the Court's ruling in Goldberg. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying
text.
199. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE § 400.902 (1997) (proposed version) (copy on file with author).
200. The proposed rules would still allow the reinstatement of benefits if a claimant requests a
hearing, in writing, within ten days of the mailing of the notice of the negative action, significantly
easing the impact of the lack of prior notice on the recipient. Id. § 400.904(5).
201. FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY, STATE OF MICHIGAN, DELEGATION OF HEARING
AUTHRoRITrrY (1997) (copy on file with author).
202. The TANF program requires recipients to participate in work activities in order to receive
their benefits. See The Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 824(o)(2), 110 Stat.
2105. Until recently, it appeared that welfare recipients who work would also be exempt from
statutory worker protections, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Occupational Health and
Safety Act, making even those who work second class citizens with little hope of belonging to
society. However, the recently passed House Appropriations Bill, Pub. L. No. 105-133, 111 Stat. 251
(1997), states that welfare workers are "employees" subject to statutory protections. The willingness
of Congress to agree to this requirement indicates at least some political will to limit the
disenfranchisement of the poor. It also indicates the gains that may result when the poor are
supported by powerful lobbyists for big labor, for whom the protections were a priority. See Adam
Clymer, White House and the G.O.P. Announce Deal to Balance Budget and to Trim Taxes, N.Y.
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C. The Lack of Counsel
Another significant blow to the procedural rights of poor people,
initiated by Congress and supported by court rulings, is the decline in
access to legal representation for poor people. The principle development
in this area is Congress's recent cuts in funding for the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC). Representation by an attorney is crucial to enforce
the rights, both procedural and substantive, of the poor. 3 The Legal
Services Corporation is the principal provider of counsel to the poor."
However, in recent years Congress has drastically cut funding to the
LSC.2' As a result, the number of attorneys available to poor people has
diminished significantly.' Moreover, recent Court rulings indicate that
resort to the courts to find a right to counsel would be fruitless. The lack
of counsel is a significant blow to the ability of those who cannot afford
an attorney to participate in the legal process.
In particular, the lack of representation by counsel affects women
and people of color, who have historically suffered from discrimination,
most severely. Studies show that women have a particularly hard time
speaking for themselves in court and other formal situations because of
speech patterns that accompany gender domination." Some linguists
have noted significant differences in the speech patterns of women and
men, with men being more direct and efficient in transmitting informa-
tion, and women more concerned at being polite and avoiding offending
the listener.' Other linguists critique this finding and argue that
women's speech patterns are just different "strategies" for conveying
information, which are most pronounced in the speech of racially and
TIMEs, July 29, 1997, at Al (noting that "[ulnions had feared that if those employees were paid less,
they would undercut union workers").
203. Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1114-15.
204. See Houseman, supra note 120, at 836-37 (describing the importance of Legal Services
Corporation to poverty law).
205. For example, Congress reduced LSC funding by thirty percent to $278 million in fiscal
year 1996, a reduction of $122 million from fiscal year 1995. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions
and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321. The budget for fiscal year
1997 provides $283 million in funding, virtually the same level as in 1996. Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997). The proposed budget for fiscal year
1998 has increased slightly, with an appropriations amount of $300 million. S. 1022, 105th Cong.
(1997) (passing Senate with 99-0 vote and currently awaiting House action).
206. In 1980, 6,559 attorneys were employed by LSC-funded programs. LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION, CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD PROGRAMS SUPPORTED BY THE LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION START OF 1984-A FACT BOOK 21 (1984). In 1996, the number of attorneys
employed by the LSC-funded programs was reduced to only 3,642. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION,
CHARACTEcRsTIcs OF FIELD PROGRAMS SUPPORTED BY THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION START
OF 1996-A FACT BOOK 7 (1996).
207. See Colene Flynn, In Search of Greater Procedural Justice: Rethinking Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, 11 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 327, 345-48 (1996); White, supra note 65, at
4.
208. See White, supra note 65, at 14-16.
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economically subordinated women.2" Both theories indicate the impor-
tance of counsel to aid those women in telling their stories to decision
makers.2 '
Despite the evidence that counsel is particularly important for the
poor and the disenfranchised, the Supreme Court has never found a con-
stitutional right to a government funded attorney for a civil litigant. In
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Court found a limited right
to a determination of whether appointment of counsel was necessary in
proceedings to determine whether parental rights should be terminated."'
However, the Court indicated that a presumption exists against constitu-
tionally requiring the appointment of counsel unless the parent also
risked criminal prosecution."2 In Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, the Court evinced even greater hostility toward a constitu-
tional right to representation by counsel when it upheld a ten dollar limit
on the amount that attorneys could be reimbursed for helping clients to
obtain VA benefits."3 Presumably, the Court's decision in Walters was
based on the fear of the expense to the government that paying attorneys
a standard fee would entail.2 If so, it is yet another example of how the
cost calculating, utilitarian approach of Mathews harms poor people.
Statistics show that poor people are more likely to prevail in hear-
ings if they are represented by counsel, because without counsel, even
formal procedures are often ignored by judges.25 Formal procedures are
designed to foster participation and enhance the fairness of the decision-
making process."6 Without attorneys to enforce those procedural protec-
tions, however, the ability of poor people to participate in decisions that
affect their lives will be limited. 7 In practical terms, the declining avail-
ability of counsel to poor people may be the greatest blow to their ability
to participate in those decisions, and the most significant factor in the
due process counterrevolution.
D. Limits on Civil Litigation
Recent restrictions on the ability of the poor to use civil litigation to
effectuate law reform constitute another development in the due process
209. Id. at 15-16.
210. See also Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1597-1607 (1991) (critiquing the mediation process because lawyers are often excluded
and arguing that exclusion of attorneys disproportionately hurts women clients).
211. 452 U.S. 18,31-32(1981).
212. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25-27.
213. 473 U.S. 305,334 (1985).
214. Walters, 473 U.S at 320-21 (noting that "the marginal gains from affording an additional
procedural safeguard often may be outweighed by the societal cost of providing such a safeguard").
215. See Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1114 nn.13-15 (citing statistical studies).
216. See Fiss, supra note 151, at 1077-78 (arguing that the judicial process knowingly struggles
against inequalities of wealth between the parties).
217. See Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1115 n.22 (providing transcript of Jernigan "trial").
[Vol. 75:1
GIVING SUBSTANCE TO PROCESS
counterrevolution. Restrictions recently imposed by Congress have lim-
ited the activities of attorneys funded by the Legal Services Corporation
to prevent LSC attorneys from bringing class actions,28 and from chal-
lenging welfare reform measures in court or in administrative hearings."9
Proposed amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 also would
restrict plaintiffs' use of class actions. These developments restrict the
ability of the poor to participate through the means of civil litigation,
cutting off another avenue of process.
LSC attorneys are now prohibited from representing clients in class
action suits, which have historically been a tool for lawyers for the poor
to use to enact law reforms which benefit the poor.22° The ability to use
civil litigation to effectuate law reform is particularly important for those
disenfranchised due to their race, class or gender because their lack of
economic resources and corresponding lack of political clout make it
difficult for them to effectively use the political process to achieve re-
form and for each to hire an individual attorney for their case. The prohi-
bition on class action representation by LSC-funded attorneys, by far the
principal provider of legal representation for the poor, thus cuts off one
of the main avenues for poor people to fight for legal reform.22'
The fastest developing and most crucial current legal issue for the
poor are the major changes that have resulted from state and federal wel-
fare reform measures. Yet, restrictions on LSC attorneys insure that poor
people will find it extremely difficult to influence those reform measures
through the use of the civil litigation process. Those restrictions prohibit
LSC recipients from initiating litigation involving, or challenging, or
participating in, efforts to reform a federal or state welfare system.2 The
new regulation limits the scope of permissible representation to individ-
ual issues which do "not involve an effort to amend or otherwise chal-
lenge existing law."23 These restrictions clearly limit the ability of LSC
attorneys to effectively represent their clients in welfare related cases
because they mistakenly assume that attorneys can bifurcate individual
issues from challenges to the legitimacy of laws and regulations in the
218. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134
§504, 110 Stat 1321.
219. Legal Services Corporation: Welfare Reform, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,763, 30,766 (1997) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1639.3).
220. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 307 (1971)
(stating that poverty lawyers saw class actions as a major vehicle for reforming laws that affect the
poor); Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21
U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 347, 350 (1988) ("In its twenty-two years of existence, subdivision (b)(2) has
contributed to the revolutions in civil and welfare rights that have marked the legal history of an
era."). For example, Goldberg was brought as a class action suit.
221. The new restrictions on LSC funds also prohibit lobbying by anyone employed in a
program which receives those funds, thus cutting off the other main avenue for law reform. See infta
notes 244-51 and accompanying text.
222. Legal Services Corporation: Welfare Reform, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,763, 30,766 (1997).
223. Id.
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representation of their clients.22' Most importantly, however, these re-
strictions severely limit the ability of poor people to participate in deci-
sions about governmental policies that will almost surely impact on their
lives.2" The LSC restrictions are an example of how procedure without
substance can be hollow for poor people. Even if LSC attorneys continue
to be funded, their ability to help their clients and bring about substantive
justice has been hampered severely by the restrictions.
The proposed amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
also limit the ability of plaintiffs to bring class actions and reduce proce-
dural protections for class action plaintiffs. Two proposed changes most
threaten the procedural rights of class actions plaintiffs. One proposed
amendment would allow for the certification of classes for settlement
purposes only."6 This proposed amendment contains no effective guide-
lines for certifying such a class, it may violate the constitutional "case or
controversy" requirement, and it invites collusion between lawyers who
wish to settle actions to insure payment of attorneys' fees, raising ethical
concerns.27 Moreover, to the extent that the proposed changes would
encourage settlement of class actions, they would concomitantly reduce
the procedural protections of class action litigants, rendering them sub-
ject to the more informal, and less protective, settlement process.2 8 A
second proposed amendment to Rule 23 would allow for interlocutory
appeal of trial court orders certifying classes, but not for court orders
denying class certification.2" Again, the pattern is clear. This proposed
change would favor defendants, who tend to be richer, more powerful,
and more likely to benefit from delay, and harm plaintiffs, who tend to
have fewer resources. Thus, both proposed changes would limit the abil-
ity of poor people to effectuate law reform through class actions, further
contributing to the due process counterrevolution.
E. Barriers to Political Participation
The ultimate form of participation in a democracy is the ability to
take part in the political system. Yet, the rising costs of political cam-
224. See Recent Legislation, Constitutional Law-Congress Imposes New Restrictions On Use
of Funds By The Legal Services Corporation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1346, 1347 n.12 (1997).
225. In addition, at least one state, Michigan, has promulgated roles that exempt welfare
eligibility standards from the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
MICH. CoMp. LAWS. § 24.207(7)(m) (Supp. 1997). Without the notice and public hearing required
administratively, welfare recipients will have even less opportunity to influence welfare policy.
226. See COMMIrEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF APPELLATE, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41-43 (1996) (containing the August 1996
proposed amendments to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(4)).
227. See Letter from Steering Committee To Oppose Proposed Rule 23, to Honorable
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 28,
1996) (on file with author).
228. See Delgado et al., supra note 151, at 1395; Fiss, supra note 151, at 1076-78.
229. H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997).
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paigns and resulting importance of campaign fund raising has had the
effect of limiting the ability of people without money to have an impact
on that process."0 The Supreme Court has contributed to this phenome-
non in its decisions equating spending money with speech in the realm of
campaign finance. Moreover, restrictions on the ability of LSC funded
agencies to lobby on behalf of their clients further reduce the ability of
poor people to participate in public policy making. Thus, poor people are
excluded from perhaps the most important form of process-politics
itself-and risk complete disenfranchisement.
The Supreme Court linked traditional notions of process with par-
ticipation in the political process in its decision in Atkins v. Parker.3' In
Atkins, the plaintiffs challenged a generalized notice that the state of
Massachusetts issued to food stamp recipients on due process grounds.232
The notice informed recipients that their food stamp benefit levels might
be decreased as a result of changes to governing regulations, but did not
indicate the impact of the changes on an individual's case.33 The Court
found that recipients were not entitled to individualized notices or prior
hearings because across the board cuts did not trigger the protections of
the Due Process Clause." Instead, the Court found that the legislative
process gave recipients all the process that they were due when benefit
levels are adjusted by the legislature."' Thus, the Court refused to protect
poor people through judicial process and sent them into the political
realm to fend for themselves as if they were not severely handicapped in
that arena.'
The Supreme Court has recognized limited economic rights to par-
ticipate in the political process in cases involving clear economic barriers
to participation. For example, the Court struck down the Texas system of
financing primary elections in which the candidates themselves were
required to pay the filing fees, 37 and a Louisiana law restricting the right
to vote in some municipal elections to "property taxpayers." '38 Of course,
the pre-Goldberg Court invalidated state poll taxes in a ruling that was
230. In fact, it could be persuasively argued that only the very rich really have the ability to
participate in the political process under the current campaign finance system.
231. 472U.S. 115 (1985).
232. Atkins, 472 U.S. at 120-21.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 129-30.
235. Id. (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1982)).
236. In an interesting related development, the Ohio state legislature passed a bill which
requires applicants for welfare to receive a voter registration application at their required orientation
meeting. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.54(f) (Banks-Baldwin 1997). Apparently, the author of this
provision recognized the importance of political participation for welfare recipients.
237. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
238. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,705-06 (1969).
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based in part on the recognition that southern states had used those taxes
to exclude African Americans from voting.239
In all of these cases, state fees were a concrete barrier to the basic
rights to vote and to run for political office. However, the Court has been
considerably less sensitive to the impact of one's income on the ability to
participate in the political process in cases involving less tangible eco-
nomic barriers to participation which are more intangible. For example,
in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court found that the expenditure of money on
political campaigns is political speech, protected by the First Amend-
ment.2" The Court upheld restrictions on direct contributions to cam-
paigns, but struck down provisions of federal campaign finance laws that
limited independent expenditures and expenditures by candidates of per-
sonal or family funds. Relying on similar logic, the Court also has struck
down restrictions on the amount of money that corporations could spend
on public initiative campaigns.
4
In the campaign finance cases, the Court ruled on the side of auton-
omy of people with financial resources, despite the adverse effect that the
ruling would have on the ability of people without those resources to
participate in the debate. Because the Court has been unwilling to inter-
vene on behalf of the disenfranchised, it has compounded the injustice
inherent in a capitalist society."2 Since the Court's rulings, the price of
campaigns has skyrocketed. 3 Special interest Political Action Commit-
tees (PACs) have become the most important source of campaign fund-
ing, and have taken on the role of shaping the political agenda, deter-
mining which issues are addressed, and which are ignored, in the politi-
cal debate. Yet PACs are inherently non-democratic because they are
privately run and therefore unaccountable for their campaign tactics.
Because the power PACs have is directly related to the amount of money
239. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1966).
240. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
241. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290 (1981) (striking down City of Berkeley ordinance limiting contributions to $250 to committees
formed to support or oppose ballot measures); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978) (striking down a Massachusetts statute aimed at prohibiting corporate expenditures for the
purpose of influencing votes).
242. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOwA L. REv. 1405,1410 (1986)
("[A]utonomy may be insufficient to insure a rich public debate. Oddly enough, it might even be
destructive of that goal.") (emphasis added); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 781,
783 (1987) (advocating an activist role of the state in First Amendment cases to protect minority
voices from being drowned out). Phillip Fremont-Smith, a spokesman for the National Republican
Congressional Committee, equated spending money with political speech when he recently
explained, "I haven't seen any skittishness from donors. People want to be involved in politics. They
want to add their voice." Leslie Wayne, The Parties Talk of Reform, And Bring in Record Money,
N.Y. TimES, Aug. 6, 1997, at Al.
243. See Joseph Finley, Comment, The Pitfalls of Contingent Public Financing in
Congressional Campaign Spending Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 735, 735-37 (1995); Marty Jezer &
Ellen Miller, Money Politics: Campaign Finance and the Subversion of American Democracy, 8
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467, 468-89 (1994); Wayne, supra note 242, at Al.
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that they raise, few PACs represent the interests of the poor. Few PACs
represent the interests of minorities, and those that do rely on limited
funding and therefore have limited power. Moreover, the increased im-
portance of money in the political process by its very nature reduces the
access of the poor to that process. The Court's overly capitalist interpre-
tation of the First Amendment, equating money with speech, has further
reduced the ability of the poor and the disenfranchised to participate, and
has thus contributed to the due process counterrevolution.
Because the access of most people to politicians is limited due to
their lack of economic resources, they must resort to lobbyists to voice
their cause." Yet, recently enacted restrictions on LSC funds will de-
crease the number of lobbyists for the poor. In 1996, Congress passed
legislation that would prohibit the use of any LSC funds by any agency
that is engaged in lobbying activities, " or by any agency that is engaged
in welfare reform litigation or lobbying." In response to public criticism
and court rulings finding the regulations prohibiting lobbying with non-
LSC funds unconstitutional 47 the rule was amended to allow agencies to
use non-LSC funds for lobbying."M However, the restrictions on lobbying
for welfare reform issues remain. Moreover, the access to lobbyists is
still limited to those funded by non-LSC funds. Thus, that channel to
participation in the political process has been narrowed.
Recent reforms in public benefits program indicate that the voices
of poor people are not being heard due to the barriers to their participa-
tion in the political process, and the importance of money in that process.
For example, the TANF program places a five year life time limit on the
receipt of welfare benefits."4 Amendments to the federal food stamp
regulations similarly limit the receipt of food stamps to three months in a
36 month period if the recipient does not fulfill the work requirement.'
The limit on food stamps is particularly significant for unemployed
"able" adults, for whom food stamps were the only source of income.
Leaving aside the issue of whether other reforms, such as work require-
244. The successful lobbying of labor unions on behalf of statutory protections for welfare
recipients who work illustrates the impact of powerful allies to speak for the poor within the political
process.
245. See Omnibus Consolidated Recissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134 § 504, 110 Stat. 1321.
246. Id. § 504(a)(16).
247. See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Services Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Haw. 1997)
(enjoining the LSC from enforcing restrictions on the recipients' use of non-LSC funds because the
court determined a fair likelihood that those regulations infringed on First Amendment rights), cited
in Legal Services Corporation: Use of Non-LSC Funds, Transfers of LSC Funds, Program Integrity,
62 Fed. Reg. 27,695, 27,695 (1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1610).
248. See Legal Services Corporation: Use of Non-LSC Funds, Transfers of LSC Funds,
Program Integrity, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,695 (1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1610).
249. The Welfare Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 408(a)(7), 110 Stat. 2105 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)).
250. The Welfare Reform Act § 824(o)(2).
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ments, will benefit the poor, it is clear that the stringent time limits on the
receipt of benefits will cause hardship to many people, particularly dur-
ing hard economic times. It is apparent that the voices of those people
were not heard when these limits were proposed and enacted."' Thus, the
TANF program is a striking example. of how the lack of procedural rights
can result in a lack of substantive rights.
V. THE WIDENING GAP
The due process counterrevolution will most severely affect the
rights of poor people. The counterrevolution also may impact some mid-
dle class people. Those who fail to pay their child support or are arrested
for drunk driving are affected by recent statues enacted by some states
that reduce procedural rights in those arenas. However, procedural pro-
tections for the more affluent owners of "old property" have not been
threatened by the counterrevolution. Instead, in some statutory arenas the
procedural rights of the more affluent have been expanded. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the rights of the most affluent
members of society in recent cases regarding the regulatory takings doc-
trine. As a result of these developments, the gap between the procedural
rights of the rich and the poor has widened and may grow wider still.
A. Exceptions to the Counterrevolution
Because it hinged on expanding the definition of property to include
government benefits, the due process revolution had the greatest positive
impact on recipients of those benefits, many of whom have low incomes.
Therefore, the recipients of government benefits have the most to lose
from the due process counterrevolution in the civil and administrative
realms. Moreover, the developments in other procedural areas, described
above, are clearly the most harmful to those who lack economic re-
sources. Yet, the "old property," that is real property and other tangible
economic assets, remain protected, and unaffected by the counterrevolu-
tion.ns Moreover, while most public employees may lose the procedural
rights that they currently enjoy under the counterrevolution, due process
protections will continue to apply to academics and to those specialized
government employees whose skills could not be transferred easily to the
private realm, and who are generally well compensated."s Therefore, the
people who are least likely to be harmed by the due process counter-
revolution are those who already have the most resources in our society.
251. It is also possible, as Denise Morgan suggested to me in a recent conversation, that
Congress heard the voices of poor people but just did not care. Even if Congress did hear the
viewpoint of poor people that opposed recent reforms, their actions indicate that the voice was not
being heard "loud" enough, most likely because of the lack of financial resources to "amplify" their
voices.
252. See Pierce, supra note 4, at 1995-97.
253. See id.
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Some aspects of the due process counterrevolution may affect the
majority of people in this country who are middle and working class. For
example, Congress recently enacted a statute requiring states to imple-
ment procedures to improve child support enforcement by providing for
the suspension of professional licenses of people who are behind in their
child support payments." ' Some states have passed laws allowing for the
suspension of drivers' licenses of those arrested for driving while intoxi-
cated, without providing for prior notice or hearings."s These laws will
harm middle class people who own cars and earn enough to incur child
support obligations. However, they arguably will be more harmful to the
poor who cannot afford to pay child support, and who cannot afford to
pay a lawyer to help them beat or plea-bargain drunk driving charges.
Moreover, even as the due process rights of the poor and the middle
class are being reduced, the rights of the more affluent are being ex-
panded statutorily. For example, the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986 strengthens procedural protections for doctors subject to
disciplinary review board actions.' Those protections include enhanced
notice requirements and detailed provisions governing the hearing proc-
ess." The purpose of the bill was to provide protections and incentives
for physicians participating in professional peer reviews and limit the
threat of private money damage liability under federal anti-trust laws."
Similarly, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights contains provisions for civil dam-
ages for unauthorized collection of taxes and disclosure of information."
Although the bill purports to enhance the procedural rights of all taxpay-
ers, it will obviously be of most use to those who pay higher taxes be-
cause they are likely to sustain higher damages. Both acts illustrate the
ability of money to bargain for more procedural protections through the
use of the political process.
B. A New Process Revolution?
Even as the Court has cut back significantly on the definition of
what liberty and property merit due process protections, the Court has
expanded greatly its protection of the property of the affluent in society
through its activist approach to cases involving compensation for regu-
254. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16) (West Supp. 1997). The statute provides for prior notice of license
suspension, but does not specifically require a hearing prior to suspension. id.
255. See CAL. VEHI. CODE § 23157 (West 1997); 1997 Ohio Legis. Bull. 5 (Anderson) (to be
codified at OIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.191).
256. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 §§ 411-412, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,111-11,112
(1994).
257. See id.
258. Id. § 402 (stating the findings of Congress prompting the Act).
259. Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 100-647 § 7433, 102 Stat. 3730, 3748-49
(1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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latory takings." In recent rulings, the Court has taken an activist stance
in increasing the burden that the state must meet in order to use its police
power to regulate private property by limiting development in further-
ance of the public interest. The regulatory takings cases rest, at least in
part, on the notion that private property owners are entitled to use their
property in whatever way that they want.26' Thus, the Court has seem-
ingly created and expanded a new form of entitlement to private prop-
erty. Moreover, the Court has created a new categorical approach to
evaluating state action in regulatory takings, greatly increasing both the
amount of process and the compensation that is due for private property
owners in that context.
The Takings Clause of the Constitution is similar to the Due Process
Clause in that it is the other constitutional provision that expressly pro-
tects property from government interference. 2 It is by nature more pro-
tective of the property of the more affluent, because an individual must
own tangible property of value to benefit from the protections of the
Takings Clause.63 In the arena of compensation for regulatory takings,
the court first determines whether or not the state's use of its police
power to limit the property owner's use of his land is a taking. " Then,
the court determines whether or not the state must compensate the prop-
erty owner for any decrease in the value of the property resulting from
the state's use of its power." This two-step process is analogous to the
Court's two-step due process jurisprudence-determining first whether a
property interest or liberty interest exists which triggers protections, and
then what protections are due. Even as the Court has restricted both steps
of the due process analysis at the expense of the poor and the disenfran-
chised, it has expanded both steps of its regulatory takings doctrine to the
benefit of the most affluent members of society.
In the first step of the regulatory takings doctrine, the Court has
taken an extremely broad view of the ability of owners of real estate, the
260. See Robert J. Hopperton, Standards of Judicial Review in Supreme Court Land Use
Opinions: A Taxonomy, an Analytical Framework, and a Synthesis, 51 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 1, 81-87 (1997). The Court has expanded the doctrine of regulatory takings in several
cases. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
261. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
262. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 359-60.
263. W. David Koeninger has suggested to me in a conversation that perhaps poor people who
are advocating for more procedural rights should argue that their property falls under the Takings
Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause. For example, public housing tenants that face the
demolition of their units without compensation other than their replacement by Section 8 certificates,
could argue that their property is being taken without compensation. See generally W. David
Koeninger, A Room of One's Own and Five Hundred Pounds Becomes a Piece of Paper and "Get a
Job:" Evaluating Changes in Public Housing Policy from a Feminist Perspective, 16 ST. LouiS U.
PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997). I agree that this is an interesting idea which should be explored.
264. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
265. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
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most traditional form of "old property," to use their property without
state interference. Of course, not all people who benefit from compensa-
tion will be very affluent. However, to benefit from the clause, a person
must own at least some real property, taking them out of the category of
abject property. Moreover, the real estate at issue is sometimes quite
valuable. For example, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
plaintiff sought and received over $1.2 million in compensation for the
regulatory taking of two beach front lots on an island in South
Carolina. ' The state of South Carolina had passed a Coastal Preservation
Act that had the effect of prohibiting development on the two beach front
lots.26 Accepting the trial court's finding that the prohibition deprived the
plaintiff of all of the value of his land, the Court found that any state ac-
tion which has such an effect constitutes a per se taking.6 In Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, the Court found that the denial of a land
use permit to owners of beach front property who wished to tear down a
bungalow and build a larger house was a taking that required compensa-
tion.6 ' The Court's reasoning in both cases rests on the premise that
property owners are entitled to use their property in any manner that they
wish °.2 ' Thus, the Court's rulings enhance the value of the ownership
interest of affluent property owners based on their entitlement to use it as
they choose.
The second means by which the Court has expanded the scope of its
regulatory takings doctrine is by heightening its scrutiny of state action
to determine whether compensation is constitutionally required. In previ-
ous cases regarding regulatory takings, the Court had recognized the
ability of states to remove all of the value of private property, without
compensating the owner, when the state's interest in doing so was suffi-
ciently compelling.' In recent cases, however, the Court has applied an
extremely high level of scrutiny to determine whether the state's interest
is sufficiently compelling. For example, in Nollan, for the first time the
Court imposed a "nexus" requirement-requiring that the state imposed
condition must serve the same governmental purpose as the development
266. 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 (1992).
267. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 110-11. The Court was extremely eager to hear the case in Lucas,
granting certiorari even though the issue was arguably not ripe for review. Id. at 1061-62 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Prior to the ruling of the South Carolina court finding no compensable taking, the
South Carolina legislature passed a statute which allowed property owners such as Lucas to apply
for special permits which would exempt them from the coastal preservation regulations. Id. at 1010-
11. Lucas had not even applied for such a permit at the time that the Court agreed to hear the case.
Id. at 1042 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 1030 (stating that when a regulation totally hinders productive and beneficial uses of
property, "compensation must be paid to sustain it").
269. 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987).
270. See Nolan, 483 U.S. at 831.
271. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1047-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had
repeatedly recognized the government's ability to regulate property without compensation no matter
how adverse the financial effect may be by weighing private and public interests).
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ban."2 In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court added a level of scrutiny to
the "nexus" requirement, stating that the government's purpose must be
"roughly proportional" to the proposed impact of the regulation for the
"nexus" requirement to be met. 3 And, the Court clarified that the city or
state has the burden of establishing the constitutionality of its regulations
by making an "individualized determination. ' '27
Most significantly, in Lucas, the Court for the first time created a
categorical rule that if the regulation removed all of the value of the land,
it was a per se taking. The categorical approach is the highest level of
scrutiny to which a court may subject state action.7' It is "uncompro-
misingly deadly to legislative action. ' 76 The categorical approach al-
lowed the Lucas Court to completely disregard evidence that the plaintiff
knew that his property had been flooded in at least half of the prior forty
years. " The categorical approach also does not take into account the
extent to which the state's action may be justified as protective of the
safety of its people. In Lucas, the state's arguably compelling interest in
limiting coastal development was highlighted by the extensive damage to
ocean front property caused by hurricane Hugo prior to the passage of
the Coastal Preservation Act in question.2 78 The Court's categorical ap-
proach disregarded even such a compelling interest on the part of the
state.
The high level of scrutiny to which the Court subjects regulatory
takings contrasts markedly with the rational basis scrutiny merited by
most due process categories. '9 This categorical approach also stands in
sharp contrast to the Court's Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test.' The
Mathews balancing test requires courts to balance the interests of the
individual against those of the state, and insures that the cost of the proc-
ess always will weigh against the individual.28' The categorical approach,
on the other hand, allows courts to completely disregard societal interests
and concerns once the individual interest has been established. Moreo-
ver, the cost to the state is immaterial in the categorical approach. Ironi-
cally, the state of South Carolina could have paid for many Goldberg-
272. Nollan, 483 U.S. 837.
273. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
274. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
275. See Hopperton, supra note 260, at 83-84.
276. Id. at 7.
277. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1038 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
278. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1040 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that petitioner did not even challenge the state legislature's finding that the
building ban was necessary to protect property and life).
279. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 314-15; Rutherford, supra note 5, at 25.
280. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
281. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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style hearings with the $1.2 million that it had to pay as compensation to
the petitioner as a result of the Court's ruling in Lucas.
The extraordinarily heightened level of scrutiny to which the Court
subjected the state legislation in Lucas and Dolan is reminiscent of the
substantive due process approach used by the Court to invalidate state
statutes during the Lochner era. 2 Overwhelmed by the sense of unfair-
ness by the state taking over $1 million from a private citizen, the Court
relied on substantive notions of fairness and justice to create a remedy
for the landowner whom, it found, had been wrongfully deprived of his
property.' Moreover, like the Court in Lochner, the Lucas Court refused
to presume the validity of state regulations when they are reasonably
related to a state interest.' This approach is a major departure from the
Court's usual rational basis scrutiny of state statutes governing economic
issues.2" The Court's regulatory takings doctrine represents the kind of
strict scrutiny that it has so far refused to apply to economic regulations
that affect poor people. Even as the Court takes away the procedural
rights of the poorest of the poor and refuses to recognize economic rights
on their behalf, it has resorted to a long discredited Lochnerian approach
to find substantive due process rights for the most affluent in our society.
VI. REINTERPRETING THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The formalist individualist approach that the Court has taken to due
process issues since the due process revolution has failed to bring about
the fairness and justice that should be essential elements of due process.
The Court's broad communitarian language of equality in Goldberg en-
visioned a world in which one's procedural rights would not depend on
the level of one's income. However, the promise of Goldberg faded in
the ensuing years as the Court became mired in formalistic reasoning and
analysis. With or without the Court's formal acknowledgment, it is clear
that substantive values affect all of its procedural decisions. ' It is time
for the Court to return to the communitarian notion of process and justice
that it articulated in Goldberg and give substance to process, to counter
the due process counterrevolution.
The Court has applied an "organic" approach to process in the past
which is based on a substantive communitarian notion of fairness rather
than the individualist formalist approach which it has adopted in the
282. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), the Court struck down a state statute that limited the number of working hours of bakers to
60 hours per week and 10 hours per day as violative of the substantive due process right to contract.
283. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-32. The Court's approach is particularly ironic given that the facts
of Lucas indicate that the owner knew very well that the land in question was in danger of being
flooded, and the houses washed away, in the event of a hurricane or other major storm. See id. at
1020-22.
284. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406 n.9 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 314-15.
286. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 324; MASHAW, supra note 1, at 5.
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more recent years. Such an organic approach would, by its very nature,
be more responsive to the needs of the poor. Several scholars have re-
cently called for the Court to abandon the formalist approach in favor of
a more organic approach which allows for the incorporation of more
expansive notions of justice and fairness.28 My approach would build on
theirs, but would emphasize the potential of an organic approach to foster
communitarian values such as economic justice and fairness throughout
society.
A. Revisiting the Organic Approach
In order to address the widening gap between the procedural rights
of the rich and the poor, the Court must take a new approach to due proc-
ess which expressly hinges on the need for substantive fairness. The ap-
proach to process currently adopted by the Court has failed to provide
that substantive fairness for poor people in this country. Instead, the
amount of process that one receives is commensurate with one's level of
income. This unequal treatment is antithetical to the promise of the due
process clause because it is arbitrary. To remedy the problem, the Court
must recognize the impact of money on process, and acknowledge the
importance of procedural parity to a functional democracy. In Goldberg,
the Court espoused a communitarian view of process in which substan-
tive fairness was a primary value, but adopted a formalist approach
which led to individualism and formalism that belied its original prom-
ise. However, prior to Goldberg, the Court addressed some due process
issues with an organic approach that emphasized the importance of
treating people fairly, and with dignity. The Court should return to that
approach in order to adequately address the dire needs of poor people
who are threatened with complete disenfranchisement from our society.
The essence of due process is that the government should not act
arbitrarily towards its citizens.2" In recent years, however, the general
prohibition of arbitrary government action, with its inherent promises of
fairness and equality, has been lost in the technical positivist doctrine of
the Court's due process decisions.289 In contrast, an organic, less formal
approach to due process would allow the Court to depart from the bifur-
cated analytical structure which currently dominates its due process ju-
risprudence.' Instead, the Court would rely on a more flexible notion
that "when the state inflicts any serious injury on an individual, it must
287. See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 42; Law, supra note 134, 810-14; Mashaw, Dignitary
Process, supra note 132.
288. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 322-23 (identifying the recurring theme in due process cases
that the government cannot be arbitrary); Rutherford, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing substantive and
procedural prohibitions against arbiwariness).
289. See Mashaw, Dignitary Process, supra note 132, at 436 (arguing that the positivist
approach leads to bizarre constitutional variations of claims).-
290. See Law, supra note 134, at 810-14.
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give her a fair opportunity to learn what is going on and to object.""'
Justice Frankfurter applied such an organic approach to process in his
concurrence to Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, when
he addressed the due process rights of members of organizations which
were included in a list of "communist" organizations to be published and
sent to the Loyalty Review Board by the Attorney General for use in
firing federal employees."2 In his concurrence, Frankfurter argued that
members of those organizations had a right to the essentials of due proc-
ess, notice and a hearing, before the list was published."9 Referring to
due process as a "feeling of just treatment... evolved through centu-
ries," Frankfurter stated that "fairness of procedure is... ingrained in
our national traditions and is designed to maintain them." 5 In an opinion
decided the year after McGrath, the Court relied on similar reasoning
when it found that pumping of the stomachs of prisoners violated their
substantive due process rights because it "shocks the conscience. '
A return to the organic approach to process would allow the Court
to sidestep the positivist problem in Goldberg, Roth and their progeny
that results when a court must determine whether or not an interest is
substantial enough to trigger protections.' The Court would no longer
become mired in a tortured determination of whether a constitutionally
protected interest is implicated. Instead, it would rely on a more basic
premise that the state should not treat its citizens arbitrarily because to do
so would be unfair."g That premise arguably underlies all of the Court's
due process jurisprudence,'" but it is especially prevalent in the Gold-
berg. In his elegant Goldberg opinion, Justice Brennan espoused the
view that the government should treat all people fairly, and with dignity,
regardless of their income or status in society.' ° The Court's opinion in
291. Id. at 810-11.
292. 341 U.S. 123, 161 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The plurality opinion, written by
Justice Burton for himself and Justice Black, held only that the publication was not authorized by the
Executive Order to the Attorney General. Id. at 126.
293. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But see Barsky v. Board of
Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (upholding medical license suspension without a hearing when the
doctor refused to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee).
294. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
295. Id.; see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884) (holding that due process
requires the protection of "the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty and property").
296. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Fallon, supra note 1, at 324 (stating
that the Rochin Court applied substantive due process to administrative actions).
297. See Law, supra note134, at 813-14.
298. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 322-23 (identifying the recurring theme in due process cases
that the government cannot be arbitrary); Rutherford, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing substantive and
procedural prohibitions on arbitrariness).
299. For example, the principle that the government cannot act arbitrarily is the rationale for the
Court's landmark ruling in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). See Alexander,
supra note 6, at 327 n.12.
300. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) ("From its founding the Nation's basic
commitment has been to foster the dignity and well being of all persons within its borders.")
(emphasis added).
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Goldberg thus prefigures a humanist view of justice, and a commitment
to substantive equality, that is arguably consistent with the organic ap-
proach.' If the Court used an organic approach to process, it would be
more responsive to the needs of the poor, as it was in Goldberg.
In his book, Due Process in the Administrative State, Jerry Mashaw
critiques the functionally oriented policy analysis of the Court's recent
due process decisions, and argues that such an analysis belies the more
meaningful and elastic promise of the due process clause.3" As an alter-
native, Mashaw suggests that courts should attempt to formulate basic
political principles which merit procedural protections."' Mashaw's
"dignitary perspective," which mirrors an organic approach to process,
would extend procedural protections to "natural rights" such as the con-
stitutional values of privacy, free expression and religious freedom."°
Equality, predictability, transparency and rationality, and participation,
are the core process values in Mashaw's theory."° Mashaw emphasizes
that his primary goal is to protect individual liberty, not to reinforce
communitarian values such as economic justice. However, the elastic
nature of Mashaw's theory, like the Court's organic approach to process,
allows courts to incorporate the notions of fairness and equality to use
process to strengthen the community as a whole. Under this communi-
tarian interpretation of Mashaw's "dignitary" theory, the right of all
members of society to participate in decisions that affect their lives, re-
gardless of their level of income, would be paramount.3"
In order for the Due Process Clause to foster the meaningful partici-
pation of poor people in decisions that affect their lives, it must incorpo-
rate an element of equal protection."° That is, people should be able to
enjoy the same procedural protections regardless of their level of
income.' The prevention of arbitrary action by the state is essential to
due process, and unequal treatment is more likely to be arbitrary.3 '
Therefore, equality should be a core value of the Court's approach to
process."' In order for process to foster equality in a meaningful fashion,
301. See White, supra note 65, at 3.
302. See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 42.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 166.
305. Id. at 173-77.
306. Id. at 169.
307. See Flynn, supra note 207, at 330 (pointing out that the Court articulated the "promotion
of participation and dialogue" as goals of the due process system in Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S.
238 (1980)); Rutherford, supra note 5, at 42 (calling "participation" a major theme of due process).
308. See Rutherford, supra note 5, at 5.
309. See Zietlow, supra note 27, at 1143-49 (arguing that providing due process rights for more
affluent people, but not for the poorest of the poor, would violate the Equal Protection Clause).
310. Rutherford, supra note 5, at 65.
311. See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 173 (listing "equality" as an intuitive process value);
Rutherford, supra note 5, at 71 (arguing that the Due Process, Equal Protection and Privileges and
Immunities Clauses all incorporate notions of equality). But see id. at 39-41 (noting that the Court
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however, the Court must recognize the impact of economic forces on the
ability of people to participate in decisions that affect them. The Court
should acknowledge the economic needs of would-be participants, and
weigh them in favor of finding procedural rights, when to do so would
help to eliminate procedural inequity. If the Court is sensitive to the im-
pact of money on procedural rights, its procedural decisions will be more
likely to foster societal fairness. Under a communitarian organic ap-
proach, a procedure would be "fair" if it applied equally to all similarly
situated participants, regardless of their level of income, or the amount of
resources at stake in the individual case.
B. Giving Substance to Process
All of the Supreme Court's due process decisions incorporate some
substantive values. Arguably, a substantive rule and the procedure ap-
plying it must be always viewed as one package."' For example, the
Court has incorporated the substantive value of fairness into its proce-
dural jurisprudence in its "minimum contacts" analysis to determine
whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 3 Even so,
until recently the Court has been reluctant to expressly acknowledge any
notions of substantive due process for the past five decades."' In the
context of regulatory takings, the Court appears to have returned to a
Lochnerian approach to strike down legislative action in the context of
regulatory takings. The Court has been willing to recognize substantive
due process to protect the rights of the most affluent in our society. Un-
der a communitarian notion of process, the Court would also be willing
to recognize substantive due process rights to protect the rights of the
least affluent, who face the risk of complete disenfranchisement in our
society.
Historically, the Court has been very reluctant to find economic
rights for the poor in the Constitution. However, the Court has informally
recognized economic need as a factor in several cases where it ruled on
the side of constitutional substantive and procedural rights for the poor.
For example, in Goldberg, the Court was clearly swayed by the substan-
tive economic needs of the plaintiffs in its decision regarding procedural
rights. The "brutal need" of the recipients of government benefits influ-
enced the Court as it found increased procedural rights for the recipients
does not seem concerned with balancing power in "minimum contacts" due process cases--in all
instances, the party with more resources seems to prevail, and that even in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), where the Court expressly incorporated the analysis of fairness into
the "minimum contacts" equation, the Court appeared to disregard the obvious imbalance of
bargaining power on the part of the franchisees).
312. See Alexander, supra note 6, at 327; see also MASHAW, supra note 1, at 5 (stating that
question of substance and process are "functionally inseparable").
313. See Fallon, supra note 1, at 317-18.
314. See id. at 322 (stating that the Court is hesitant to find substantive due process rights).
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of those benefits in the Constitution.3 ' In Goldberg, the Court recognized
welfare benefits as the sole source of income of the recipients when it
held that those recipients were entitled to a pre-termination hearing.36
The Court's protective attitude towards the poor in Goldberg is so appar-
ent that it inspired Justice Black, in his dissent, to accuse the majority of
taking a substantive due process approach which incorporated the notion
of economic justice in its procedural due process analysis. 3"'
In a few cases involving substantive rights, the Court has applied an
informally heightened level of scrutiny to government action, acknowl-
edging the economic needs of the parties involved. For example, in De-
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court applied a modified rational
basis review to strike down a statute that differentiated between house-
holds receiving food stamps.3 8 Similarly, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court ap-
plied an informally higher standard of review in upholding an equal pro-
tection challenge to a Texas statute which denied access to public educa-
tion for children of illegal immigrants."9 Both cases involved plaintiffs
with few economic resources. The Court also has recognized the severity
of depriving people of the means of their livelihood in rulings finding
pre-termination procedural rights for government employees.32
In a few other cases, the Court has applied a hybrid analysis based
on both due process and equal protection principles to find economic
based procedural rights in some circumstances. For example, the Su-
preme Court has found a constitutional right to waiver of appellate court
fees for indigent litigants in criminal cases.3"' The Court has also recog-
nized the right to waiver of civil court fees in divorce cases.22 and appeals
of parental rights termination decisions.3" Concomitantly, relying on
similar principles, the Court has struck down state statutes requiring fil-
ing fees for political candidates as unconstitutionally limiting the ability
315. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
316. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,264 (1970). But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
340-41 (1976) (noting that recipients of disability benefits may have other sources of income when
the Court determined that they were not entitled to pre-termination hearings).
317. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 276-77 (Black, J., dissenting); see also DAVIS, supra note 60, at
115-16.
318. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (analyzing the legislative purpose behind the statute that
prohibited the distribution of food stamps to households containing unrelated adults, and finding it
constitutionally invalid under even a rational basis review because the legislature intended to harm a
politically unpopular group, hippies, when it enacted the statute).
319. 457 U.S. 202, 220-24 (1982).
320. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1985).
321. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971) (finding a constitutional right
to waiver of appellate fees in criminal misdemeanor cases); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19
(1956) (finding a constitutional right to waiver of appellate fees in criminal matters when the
defendant risks incarceration).
322. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971).
323. M.L.B.v.S.L.J., 117S. Ct. 555,570(1996).
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of poor people to participate in the political process.32 ' Thus, the Court
has sometimes been willing, albeit reluctantly, to incorporate economic
justice as a substantive value into its analysis when determining the pro-
cedural rights of the poor.
Finally, in two of its most recent rulings, the Court has indicated
both a receptiveness to substantive due process and a solicitous attitude
towards the poor and the disenfranchised. In M.L.B. v. S.LJ.3" and Ro-
mer v. Evans,3" the Court relied on notions of substantive fairness to find
rights to participation for people who have been disenfrancished due to
their income or status as a group that suffered from the prejudice of the
majority.
In M.L.B., the Court ruled that the state of Mississippi could not bar
an indigent woman from appealing a trial court ruling terminating her
parental rights because she could not afford to pay the fees associated
with the appeal."l The M.L.B. Court strictly limited its ruling to cases
involving parental rights terminations, focusing on the fundamental na-
ture of the parent-child relationship.328 However, the Court's decision to
even hear the case is significant. It marks the first time in almost a quar-
ter century that the Court addressed the constitutional rights of civil liti-
gants to waiver of fees, and only the second time that the Court has
found a constitutional right to the waiver of fees in a civil case.3" In
M.L.B., the Court relied on both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution. Due process was implicated because the
proceedings below did not appear to be fair, and the petitioner was de-
nied any means of redressing that unfairness.33° Significantly, however,
the Court stated that its ruling was based primarily on economic based
equal protection principles because the Mississippi rule prohibited the
petitioner from appealing based solely on her inability to pay the costs?'
Thus, the Court's decision was based on the substantive values of both
fairness and equality in an organic approach to procedural rights.
324. See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
325. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 567-68.
326. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
327. M.L.B., 117 S. Ct. at 570.
328. See id. at 569 ("[We have repeatedly noted what sets parental status termination decrees
apart from mine run civil actions, even from other domestic relations matters such as divorce,
paternity, and child custody.").
329. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971) (finding a constitutional right to
apply for waiver of filing fees in divorce cases); supra text accompanying notes 55-56. But see
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1973) (per curiam) (finding that the State of Oregon was
not constitutionally required to waive fees for welfare recipients seeking judicial review of
administrative decisions); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (finding no such right to
waiver of fees in bankruptcy cases); supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
330. M.L.B., 117 S. CL at 566.
331. Id. But see id. at 570 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that "due process is quite a
sufficient basis for our holding," and stating that the fundamental nature of the parent child
relationship was sufficient to merit the Court's holding under the Mathews v. Eldridge calculus).
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The recent case of Romer also provides guidelines for a new ap-
proach to due process.332 In that case, the Court struck down, on equal
protection grounds, a state constitutional amendment prohibiting states
and municipalities from passing legislation proscribing discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.333 As in Moreno, the Court applied an in-
formally heightened standard of review to strike down a state law under
rational basis analysis and scrutinized the legislative purpose behind the
amendment.3 The Court found that the legislative purpose reflected
animosity towards an insular class of persons, namely, gays and
lesbians.333 In its analysis, the Court also emphasized the fundamental
nature of the participatory rights implicated by the amendment itself.36
The Court pointed out that the amendment restricted the procedural
rights of gays and lesbians in two ways. First, it prohibited them from
using the legislative process to fight discrimination.337 Second, and more
significantly, the Court pointed out that the amendment arguably barred
gays and lesbians from challenging arbitrary decision by governmental
bodies.338 In its decision, the Court therefore indicated that there is some
fundamental right to participate which is implicated by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.339 That freedom implicates the ability to participate in deci-
sion making processes at several different levels, and it implicates the
ability to participate equally. Here, the Court again combined the sub-
stantive values of fairness and equality in an organic fashion to protect an
insular minority.
Both M.L.B. and Romer provide guidelines for the Court to effec-
tively address the procedural needs of poor people. In M.L.B., the Court
acknowledged the impact of the petitioner's economic need on her ability
to participate in a decision that would dramatically affect her life. In Ro-
mer, the Court applied the level of scrutiny, and the type of analysis,
which is appropriate for addressing procedural issues that impact on poor
people. Thus, the Court followed its admonition in its Carolene Products
footnote that courts must sometimes protect insular minorities from the
332. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
333. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
334. See id. at 1628-29 (citing Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1625-26.
337. See id. at 1625.
338. Id. at 1626. In Romer, the court stated:
At some point in the systematic administration of these laws, an official must determine
whether homosexuality is an arbitrary and thus forbidden basis for decision. Yet a
decision to that effect would itself amount to a policy prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of homosexuality, and so would appear to be no more valid under Amendment 2
than the specific prohibitions against discrimination the state court held invalid.
Id.
339. See id. at 1628 ("Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on
impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.").
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political process.3" The Court should do the same with regards for the
economically disadvantaged. Because the poor have been so disenfran-
chised by their inability to participate in the decisions that affect their
lives, the Court must be especially solicitous of their needs. While a con-
servative Court may be reluctant to do so, both M.L.B. and Romer indi-
cate some receptiveness to such an approach.
C. A Communitarian Theory of Process
My communitarian theory of process would build on the Court's
organic approach by adding economic based fairness as an element of the
fundamental notion implicated in the organic approach. It would borrow
the elastic nature of Mashaw's "dignitary theory" as well as borrowing
the values of equality, predictability and participation which are essential
to his theory. However, I explicitly recognize the potential of a more
elastic approach to foster fairness in a community, rather than an indi-
vidual value, by adding economic faimess as another essential value.
Finally, I would encourage the Court to give substance to process, as it
has been willing occasionally in recognizing substantive and procedural
economic rights.
To illustrate how the Court would apply my communitarian theory
of process, imagine that the Court is called upon once again to determine
whether or not welfare recipients have a right to a pre-termination hear-
ing. This time, however, the welfare recipients cannot"argue that they
have an entitlement to benefits because they are provided under a block
grant system that specifically denied their entitlement status. How is the
Court to rule? Under my approach, the Court would not allow itself to
become bogged down in an analysis of whether or not benefits were an
entitlement before it decided whether or not the constitution required
procedural protections. Instead, the Court would recognize that if welfare
recipients did not have pre-termination hearings, the state could act arbi-
trarily in denying them benefits, and find that the danger of that arbitrary
action alone is enough to violate the constitutional provision of due proc-
ess. Second, the Court would find it constitutionally impermissible for
welfare recipients to have fewer procedural rights than other, more afflu-
ent recipients of government benefits, such as holders of medical licenses
and members of the legal bar. Finally, the Court also would find that the
dire consequences of disenfranchising the poorest of the poor by sub-
jecting them to a system that is completely arbitrary and would violate
the fundamental notion of fairness which is essential to a communitarian
notion of process."'
340. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
341. Similarly, the Court should take a solicitous approach toward the rights of the poor to
uphold campaign finance reform legislation, and strike down restrictions placed on legal services
attorneys.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued in favor of an approach to process that
acknowledges the necessity of substantive economic justice, because
process without substance has failed to meet the needs of the people who
most need procedural protections. Until now, the Court's approach to
process has resulted in a system in which poor people are increasingly
disenfranchised at every level where they should have meaningful in-
volvement in the decisions that affect their lives. I have argued that the
discrepancy between the way the Court treats the procedural rights of
poor and more affluent people violates the notions of fairness and equal-
ity that should be an integral part of the Court's procedural jurispru-
dence.
In order to address the increasing disenfranchisement of the poor,
and the disparity between the procedural rights of the rich and the poor, I
have suggested that the Court adopt a communitarian organic approach
to due process that incorporates the values of equality and fairness along
with a protective attitude toward the needs of the poor. Because the poor
lack money and power, they need to resort to courts to protect them, even
as the Cdurt had suggested in Carolene Products. Under my communi-
tarian approach, fairness and equality would be essential procedural val-
ues. The Court would acknowledge the impact of economic resources on
the ability of the poor to participate in decisions that affect their lives,
and decide procedural issues in a manner that would reduce that impact
as much as possible. In the egalitarian spirit of Goldberg, the Court
should be willing to return substance to process, in order to create a sys-
tem in which all citizens enjoy the rights of citizenship regardless of their
level of income.
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